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THE EMERGING DUTY TO BARGAIN
IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR
Harry T. Edwards*

N

two decades ago, the report of the ABA Committee on
Labor Relations of Governmental Employees suggested that

EARLY

a government which imposes upon private employers certain obligations in dealing with their employees, may not in good faith refuse
to deal with its own public servants on a reasonably similar basis
modified, of course, to meet the exigencies of public service.1
A decade later, Professor Russell Smith and Theodore Clark observed that
both the increasing number of state and local employees and the
burgeoning unionization of such employees have made it imperative
that the states develop some kind of policy in response to the needs
and aspirations of public employees which, at the same time, will
suitably take account of characteristics peculiar to public employment.2
Both the ABA Report and the Smith and Clark article are
significant because they remark about the disparate treatment that
has historically been reserved for public sector employees, vis-a-vis
their private sector brethren, in the labor relations laws in the United
States. The ABA Report, which was written in 1955, proclaimed that
public employees should, as a matter of fairness, have bargaining
rights comparable to those enjoyed by private employees. The Smith
and Clark article, written ten years later, pragmatically suggested
that formalized bargaining structures should be created as a matter
of expediency to deal with the then obvious surge in the growth of
public sector unionism.
Today, the debate over the legitimacy of unionism in the government sector is largely academic. Unionization of government employ• Professor of Law, University of Michigan. B.S. 1962, Cornell University
J.D. 1965, University of Michigan. Editorial Board, Vol. 63, Michigan Law Review.-Ed.
Copyright © 1973, by Matthew Bender &: Co., Inc., and reprinted with permission.
This Article is a modified version of material originally published in SOUTHWESTERN
I.EGAL FOUNDATION 19TH !NST. ON LABOR LAW, LABOR LAW DEVELOPMENTS 1973.
The author wishes to express appreciation to Donald Anderson, a third-year student
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1. 1955 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SECTION OF LABOR RELATIONS
LAW, R:£l'ORT OF COMMITTEE ON LABOR RELATIONS OF GOVERNMENTAL EMPLOYEES 89, 90.
2, Smith &: Clark, Reappraisal of the Role of the States in Shaping Labor Relations
Laws, 1965 WIS. L. REv. 411, 423.
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ees and collective bargaining in the public sector are now recognized,
albeit not always accepted, facts of life in the United States. On this
score, it was recently reported that
[p]ublic employee unions are showing a remarkable rate of growth
at a time when labor unions in the private sector are expanding
slowly, if at all. Thirty-seven years after Congress passed the Wagner
Act to clear the way for mass organizing efforts, about one of every
four workers on private payrolls belongs to a union. In the 13 years
since Wisconsin approved a pioneering law that encouraged unionization of its state and local government employees, one of every
three public workers has enlisted in union ranks. There are now 34
states with laws providing some labor relations framework for dealing with organizations of government employees. The Federal Government now bargains on non-wage issues with unions formed by
its employees and Congress has approved collective bargaining for
employees of the semi-independent U.S. Postal Service, with arbitration of wage disputes if necessary.
Traditionally docile government workers have shown a new militancy in recent years, often defying state laws to strike for their demands despite hostile public reaction.3
The issue of concern now is not the propriety of unions in the
public sector, but rather the viability of legislated structures currently being enacted to formalize collective bargaining for public
employees. Since the first such statutes, enacted in the 1950's,4 public
sector labor relations law has experienced a rapid and accelerating
growth. In 1971 alone, nineteen states adopted legislation to change
their labor relations procedures.5 In 1972, new statutes were enacted
in Wisconsin,6 Minnesota,7 and Alaska.8
While this proliferation of new and modified legislation may give
some evidence of the increased growth of public sector unionism,
unfortunately it also suggests that federal, state, and municipal governments are experiencing certain difficulties in developing viable
systems of labor relations. Some of these problems stem from an almost slavish adherence to the notion that the public and private
8. Ax.As. STAT, §§ 23.40.070-.260 (1972).
at 1.
4. Act of Aug. 1, 1960, ch. 561, [1960] Mass. Acts & Resolves 488, as amended, MASs.
ANN. LAws ch. 149, §§ 178G-N (Supp. 1972); Act of April 27, 1957, ch. 781, § 1, [1957)
Minn. Laws 1073, as amended, MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 179.61-.77 (Supp. 1973); Act of
July 14, 1955, ch. 255, § I, [1955] N.H. Laws 386 (codified at N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 31:3
(1970)); Act of Sept. 22, 1959, ch. 509, § 1, [1959] Wis. Laws 623, as amended, Wrs. STAT.
ANN. § 111.70 (Supp. 1973).
5. Eaton, supra note 3, at 1.
6. Wrs. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.80-.97 (Supp. 1973).
7. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 179.61-.77 (Supp. 1973).
8. ALAS. STAT. §§ 23.40.070.260 (1972).
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sectors cannot be treated alike. Legal scholars and politicians continue to restate the truism that the two sectors are vastly different
because of certain legal, economic, and political constraints unique
to the public sector.9 From this it has been assumed that, for purposes
of collective bargaining, private sector legal concepts developed pursuant to the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) 10 cannot be
adopted in the public sector.11 The 1955 ABA Report illustrates this
assumption in its suggestion that bargaining be allowed in the public
sector, "modified, of course, to meet the exigencies of public service."12 Similarly, in the Smith and Clark article the authors called
for special legislation which "will suitably take account of characteristics peculiar to public service." 13
Whether the public sector is indeed sufficiently different from the
private sector to warrant the assumption that private sector precedents should be avoided, or at least modified, is a question that
can and has been argued at length; 14 therefore, it will serve no useful
purpose to rehash the issue in this Article. Rather, it is probably
sufficient to observe that, for the most part, legislators and judges
at the federal, state, and municipal levels have assumed that the two
sectors are different; as a consequence, the initial legislative and
judicial reactions to public sector unionism have been cautious.
Arguments about sovereign authority and the unlawful delegation
of legislative authority abound in the early cases; 15 the strike proscriptiqn was declared as an inviolable principle;16 and strict limits
were imposed on the process and scope of collective bargaining.17
9. See generally Anderson, Strikes and Impasse Resolution in Public Employment,
67 MICH. L R.Ev. 943 (1969); Bernstein, Alternatives to the Strike in Public Labor Relations, 85 HARv. L. R.Ev. 459 (1971); Burton &: Krider, The Role and Consequences of
Strikes by Public Employees, 79 YALE L.J. 418 (1970); Edwards, The Developing Labor
Relations Law in the Public Sector, 10 DUQUESNE L. REV. 357 (1972); Kheel, Resolving
Deadlocks Without Banning Strikes, MONTHLY LAB. R.Ev., July 1969, at 62; Wellington
&: Winter, The Limits of Collective Bargaining in Public Employment, 78 YALE L.J.
1107 (1969).
10. 29 u.s.c. §§ 151-68 (1970).
11. See, e.g., H. WELLINGTON &: R. WINTER, THE UNIONS AND THE CmES 146-48 (1971).
12. 1955 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN BAR AssOCIATION, supra note 1, at 90 (emphasis added).
13. Smith&: Clark, supra note 2, at 423 (emphasis added).
14. See articles cited in note 9 supra.
15. E.g., City of Fort Smith v. Council 38, AFSCME, 245 Ark. 409, 433 S.W.2d 153
(1968); Mugford v. Mayor &: City Council, 185 Md. 266, 44 A.2d 745 (1946); City of
Springfield v. Clouse, 356 Mo. 1239, 206 S.W.2d 539 (1947); Firefighters Local 293 v.
Gardner, 406 Pa. 395, 178 A.2d 691 (1962).
16. E.g., Norwalk Teachers' Assn. v. Board of Educ., 138 Conn. 269, 83 A.2d 482
(1951).
17. E.g., Missey v. City of Cabool, 441 S.W.2d 35 (Mo. 1969).
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However, as is frequently the case, the passage of time (coupled with
the continued growth of public sector unionism) has apparently
caused a mellowing of attitudes.
I.

THE RIGHT

To

ORGANIZE AND BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY

It is now generally accepted that public employees have a constitutional right, under the first amendment, to organize and join labor
unions.18 On the theory that this right is essentially meaningless unless the employer is compelled to bargain collectively with his employees, it has even been suggested that public employees may, pursuant to constitutional precept, compel a public employer to engage
in collective bargaining. In Indianapolis Education Association v.
Lewallen,19 a federal district court found that the unilateral actions
of a school board in sending out individual contracts to teachers and
adopting a salary benefit schedule in derogation of the exclusive
bargaining agent of the teachers constituted unjustifiable interference with the teachers' fundamental right to engage in collective
bargaining. However, the Seventh Circuit reversed and held that
there is no constitutional right to compel an employer to bargain.20
Despite this reversal, the ember of the concept that a public
employer is under a constitutionally mandated duty to have regular
dealings with a recognized union continues to glow. Recently, Judge
Merhige, sitting in the Eastern District of Virginia, ruled that a
public employee union had stated a cause of action by claiming that
the employer's refusal to communicate with the union had a "chilling effect" on the employees' first amendment rights.21 Only a few
months before, a different judge sitting in the same district had
held that a public employee union was not entitled to an order requiring a municipal employer to bargain.22 Notwithstanding this
earlier precedent, Judge Merhige suggested that "the grant of approval to organize and associate without the corresponding grant of
recognition may well be an empty and meaningless gesture." 23 Since
the case was initially decided on a motion to dismiss, it is not yet
clear whether Judge Merhige will seek to remedy the alleged "chilling effect" by compelling the public employer to bargain with the
employees' representative.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

E.g., McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1968).
71 L.R.R.M. 2898 (S.D. Ind. 1969).
Indianapolis Educ. Assn. v. Lewallen, 72 L.R.R.M. 2071, 2072 (1969).
Richmond Educ. Assn. v. Crockford, 80 L.R.R.M. 3116 (1972).
Fire Fighters Local 794 v. City of Newport News, 339 F. Supp. 13 (1972).
80 L.R.R.M. at 3117.
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The decision by Judge Merhige raises the novel suggestion that,
while a public employer may not be bound to "bargain," especially
in the absence of legislation which compels collective negotiations,
there may nevertheless be some lesser constitutionally mandated duty
to communicate and consult with the employees' union. A similar
suggestion was made in a different context by a New Jersey state
court in New Jersey Turnpike Authority v. AFSCME.24 The court
rejected the contention that the article in the New Jersey constitution guaranteeing that "persons in public employment shall have the
right to organize, present to and make known to the State ... their
grievances and proposals through representatives of their own choosing"25 was designed to guarantee or institute collective bargaining.
However, the court did rule that the disputed provision imposed an
affirmative obligation on public employers to confer with employee
representatives and to "consider in good faith" proposals and grievances.26 Although there have been these indications of a right to
consultation, most state courts have held that the state legislature
must specifically authorize public sector collective bargaining before
they will recognize, or require, full collective bargaining.27
II. THE

EMPLOYER'S AUTHORITY

To

BARGAIN

Somewhat different from the question of whether a governmental
employer may be compelled to bargain is the question of whether it
has the authority to bargain in the absence of legislative sanction.
The traditional view followed by many courts has been that "a
public agency has no legal authority to bargain or contract with a
labor union in the absence of express statutory authority." 28 How24, 83 N.J. Super. 389,200 A.2d 134 (1964).
25. N.J. CONST. art. I, para. 19.
26. 83 N.J. Super. at 397,200 A.2d at 139.
27. E.g., Delaware River &: Bay Authority v. International Organization of Masters,
45 N.J. 138, 211 A.2d 789 (1965); International Longshoremen's Assn. v. Georgia Ports
Authority, 217 Ga. 712, 124 S.E,2d 733 (1962).
28, Operating Engrs, Local 321 v. Water Works Bd., 276 Ala. 462, 463, 163 S.2d
619, 620 (1964). The extent of the common-law restriction on bargaining was recently
exemplified by the decision of the Arizona court of appeals in Board of Educ. v.
Scottsdale Educ. Assn., - Ariz. App. -, 498 P.2d 578 (1972), in which the court voided
an existing contract between the board of education and the teachers association and
held that the board had the authority to "negotiate" with the teachers only insofar
as "negotiation" meant "meeting and consulting." - Ariz. App. at -, 498 P,2d at
583. The court also ruled that the board was not free to delegate its authority to
manage and control the school district without specific legislative authorization. See
also International Longshoremen's Assn. v. Georgia Ports Authority, 217 Ga. 712, 124
S.E.2d 733 (1962); Weakly County Mun. Elec. Sys. v. Vick, 43 Tenn. App. 524, 309
S,W,2d 792 (1957).
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ever, exceptions to this rule have occasionally been made where a
governmental agency is functioning in a proprietary manner, as in
the operation of a port authority or municipal electric system.20 The
public employer's authority to bargain collectively is implied from
the agency's broad powers to make contracts for workers and to manage the enterprise. The courts in these cases have accepted the theoretical notion that where a governmental entity performs a proprietary function it must be allowed to operate as efficiently as a private
business; 30 this includes the freedom to devise means of effectively
competing in the labor market.31
Today, the importance of these occasional judicial attempts to
distinguish between "proprietary" and "uniquely governmental"
functions has lessened.32 For one thing, the increasing size and complexity of government makes it nearly impossible to draw any meaningful line between proprietary and governmental functions. For
another, more than a majority of the states and the federal government have statutes, ordinances, or executive orders regulating labor
relations in the public sector. Thus, in at least some jurisdictions, the
need for judicial creativity to encourage or sanction collective bargaining is less compelling now than in years past.
Only one significant decision, rendered by an Illinois court of
appeals, has held that a public employer has the authority, in a nonproprietary area and absent a statute, to engage in private-sector-type
collective bargaining with an exclusive representative of the employees in an appropriate unit.33 As previously noted, other state
courts have held that a public employer may engage in some lesser
degree of bargaining, such as formal or informal communication or
29. E.g., Local 266, !BEW v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist.,
78 Ariz. 30, 275 P.2d 393 (1954); Christie v. Port of Olympia, 27 Wash. 2d 534, 179
P.2d 294 (1947).
30. Local 266, !BEW v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 78
Ariz. 30, 275 P .2d 393 (1954).
31. Christie v. Port of Olympia, 27 Wash. 2d 534, 179 P.2d 294 (1947).
32. See, e.g., Indiana Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955), in which the
Supreme Court rejected the proprietary-governmental distinction as inherently unsound in applying the Federal Tort Claims Act, ch. 735, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified
in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). The distinction may yet have some life in states,
such as Arizona, which have not yet adopted public sector bargaining statutes. E.g.,
Local 266, !BEW v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 78 Ariz. 30,
275 P.2d 393 (1954).
33. Chicago Div. of Ill. Educ. Assn. v. Board of Educ., 76 Ill. App. 2d 456, 222
N.E.2d 243 (1966). However, while a public employer may be authorized to recognize
and bargain collectively with a union, he is not required to do so in Illinois. Cook
County Police Assn. v. City of Harvey, - Ill. App. 2d - , 289 N.E.2d 226 (1972). The
Illinois precedent established in Chicago Division has recently been followed in Indiana. Local 511, Teachers v. Board of Trustees, - Ind. App. - , 287 N.E.2d 891
(1972); Local 4, Teachers v. School City of Gary, - Ind. App. - , 284 N.E.2d 108 (1972).
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consultation with employee groups,34 but these courts have not
imposed any affirmative obligation on the employer to engage in
such consultations.
In the cases that hold that a public employer has no inherent
authority to bargain collectively, the courts usually justify their
decisions on the grounds that collective bargaining detracts from the
sovereign authority of the state35 or that it results in an illegal delegation of power.36 However, the knowledge, derived from actual
experience, that public sector collective bargaining does not automatically endanger the community has tended to dispel the long-held
belief that "[t]o tolerate or recognize any combination of civil service
employees ... is not only incompatible with the spirit of democracy,
but inconsistent with every principle upon which our government is
founded." 37 On the other hand, although the sovereignty and delegation concepts are relied on less frequently today to void contracts
freely entered into between public employers and employees, the
continuing impact of these theories cannot be discounted or ignored.
The best evidence of the present vitality of these doctrines may be
seen in the federal sector, where the courts have consistently refused
to interfere with labor relations problems in the federal civil service
arising under Executive Order No. 11,491.38
Ill.

THE IMPACI' OF THE STRIKE PROSCRIPTION ON
THE DUTY

To

BARGAIN

Before launching into an examination of the nature of the duty
to bargain in the public sector, one final passing comment is warranted. Probably the most significant distinction between the public
and private sectors is the long-standing and universally followed
prohibition against public employee strikes. In most states and in
the federal service, there is a common-law or legislated proscription
34. E.g., Board of Educ. v. Scottsdale Educ. Assn., - Ariz. App. - , 498 P .2d 578
(1972); Nonvalk Teachers' Assn. v. Board of Educ., 138 Conn. 269, 83 A.2d 482 (1951);
State Bd. of Regents v. Packing House Workers Local 1258, 175 N.W.2d 110 (Iowa
1970).
35. E.g., Nutter v. City of Santa Monica, 74 Cal. App. 2d 292, 168 P .2d 741 (1946);
Miami Water Works Local 654 v. City of Miami, 157 Fla. 445, 26 S.2d 194 (1946); City
of Springfield v. Clouse, 356 Mo. 1239, 206 S.W.2d 539 (1947).
36. E.g., City of Fort Smith v. Council 38, AFSCME, 245 Ark. 409, 433 S.W.2d 153
(1968); Mugford v. Mayor &: City Council, 185 Md. 266, 44 A.2d 745 (1946). Cf. State
ex rel. Local 350, Fire Fighters v. Johnson, 46 Wash. 2d 114, 278 P.2d 662 (1955).
37. Railway Mail Assn. v. Murphy, 180 Misc. 868, 875, 44 N.Y.S.2d 601, 607 (Sup.
Ct. 1943), reud. on other grounds sub nom. Railway Mail Assn. v. Corsi, 267 App. Div.
470, 47 N.Y.S.2d 404, afjd., 293 N.Y. 315, 56 N.E.2d 721 (1944), afjd., 326 U.S. 88 (1945).
38. 3 C.F.R. 262 (1973). See, e.g., Manhattan-Bronx Postal Union v. Gronouski,
350 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 978 (1966); Lodge 1647, AFGE v.
McNamara, 291 F. Supp. 286 (M.D. Pa. 1968).
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of the right to strike in the public sector.39 Only Alaska, Hawaii,
Montana, Pennsylvania, and Vermont have enacted legislation giving
public employees a limited right to strike.40
Labor leaders, of course, have argued that the absence of the
strike weapon in the public sector reduces collective bargaining to
collective begging.41 Yet, the validity of such a conclusion is at best
speculative. There is enough data to suggest that, in the public
sector, there may be a de facto right to strike, despite the legal strike
bans in force.42 The threat or exercise of this de facto right to strike
appears to be no less effective than the legalized right enjoyed by
employees in the private sector. Moreover, it is possible that statutory
impasse procedures, such as arbitration, fact-finding, and legislative
hearings, may be a source of great bargaining leverage for public
unions. For example, many municipal employers in Michigan have
claimed that the state's compulsory arbitration act for policemen and
:firemen43 has produced arbitrated settlements far in excess of what
might have been produced by traditional collective bargaining.4'
There obviously is no sure way to test this hypothesis, but the claim
at least raises the question of how much, if any, bargaining power
unions actually lose by virtue of the strike ban in the public sector.
The strike proscription probably does change the bargaining
process in the public sector, primarily because of the introduction
39. See, e.g., United Fedn. of Postal Clerks v. Blount, 325 F. Supp. 879 (D.D.C.),
afjd., 404 U.S. 802 (1971); Anderson Fedn. of Teachers v. School City of Anderson, 252
Ind. 558, 251 N.E.2d 15 (1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 928 (1970).
40. AI.As. STAT. § 23.40.200(d) (1972); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 89-12 (Supp. 1971); MoNT,
REv. ConF:S .ANN. § 41-2209 (Supp. 1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1003 (Supp. 1972);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1704 (Supp. 1972). See generally Edwards, supra note 9, at
376-78.
41. See, e.g., Wolk, Public Employee Strikes-A Survey of the Condon-Wadlin Acts,
13 N.Y. L.F. 69, '17 (1967); Bus. WEEK, Dec. 3, 1966, at 94.
42. See U.S. BUREAU OF l.ABoR STATISIICS, DEPT. OF LABOR, "\\Tome STOPPAGES IN 1971
(SELECTED FINAL TABULATIONS) 2, 6 crune 1972). There were at least 70 teacher strikes
in the fall of 1972. BNA GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT [hereinafter GERR]
No. 471, at B-10 to -14 (Sept. 25, 1972).
43, MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 423.231-.247 (1967), as amended, (Supp. 1972).
44. In its September 1972 convention the Michigan Municipal League adopted the
following resolution:
NOW THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED, That the Michigan Municipal League
in convention assembled this 28th day of September, 1972, records its continued
opposition to the compulsory arbitration of public employee labor disputes in
principle because it is destructive of free collective bargaining throughout the
public sector and is an improper intrusion on the legislative authority of local
governing bodies, impairing their ability to carry out their sworn duties to their
electors ••••
LMRS NEWSLEITER, Nov. 1972, at 1.
The Michigan Municipal League has been joined in its opposition to compulsory
police and fire arbitration provisions by similar groups in Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming. Id. at 1-2. The extent of this opposition is significant since compulsory police
and fire arbitration legislation is now in effect in only six states and New York City. Id.
at I.

April 1973]

Public Sector Bargaining

893

of and heavy reliance on statutory impasse procedures, which are not
common in the private sector. However, it is not at all clear that
the strike ban in the public sector produces any measurable change
in the "power politics" seen at the bargaining tables.

IV. THE NATURE

OF THE OBLIGATION

To

BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY

As noted earlier, the bargaining obligation, if it exists, is usually
imposed by statute. At last count, at least thirty-four states had statutes imposing some kind of bargaining obligation in the public
sector.45 The significance of a statute in establishing the parameters
of collective bargaining cannot be overemphasized. As Reynolds
Seitz has noted:
[A] statute can spell out election procedures to be used in the determination of a majority representative in an appropriate unit. It can
make clear that bargaining is to be on an exclusive basis with the
organization that represents the majority representative in an appropriate unit. It can express other intents. I£ there is no statute, whatever attempts are made at bargaining may break down in arguments
over procedure and over such questions as exclusive representation.46

The courts share the view that public sector collective bargaining
statutes are important. In fact, at least one court has taken the initiative in prodding the legislature to enact such a statute. In Dade
County Classroom Teachers Association v. Legislature of the State
of Florida,41 the Florida supreme court held that a public sector
bargaining statute or a judicial equivalent thereof was not only
necessary but required by that state's constitution.48 The court apparently concluded that the absence of statutory guidelines constituted a denial or abridgment of the constitutional right of public
employees to bargain collectively, and therefore warned the legislature that failure to pass such guidelines would force the court to
accomplish the same result by judicial fiat. However, the association's
request for mandamus to force the legislature to enact a statute was
45. For an exhaustive list of these statutes, see Blair, State Legislative Control over
the Conditions of Public Employment: Defining the Scope of Collective Bargaining for
State and Municipal Employees, 26 VAND. L. R.Ev. I, 3-4 n.18 (1973).
46. Seitz, Legal Aspects of Public School Teacher Negotiating and Participating in
Concerted Activities, 49 MARQ. L. R.Ev. 487, 498-99 (1966).
47. 269 S.2d 684 (Fla. 1972).
48. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 6 provides:
The right of persons to work shall not be denied or abridged on account of
membership or non-membership in any labor union or labor organization. The
right of employees, by and through a labor organization, to bargain collectively
shall not be denied or abridged. Public employees shall not have the right to strike,
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denied because the court felt that the judiciary should not compel
the legislature to exercise a purely legislative prerogative. Nevertheless, the court pointed to court-ordered reapportionment plans as
authority for the proposition that the court could act in the face of
legislative inaction to facilitate the exercise of constitutional rights.49
But the court refused to grant such relief, for
[t]he Legislature, having thus entered the field, we have confidence
that within a reasonable time it will extend its time and study into
this field, and, therefore, judicial implementation of the rights in
question would be premature at this time.50

V.

THE BARGAINING PROCESS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR

A.

The Legacy from the Private Sector

In private sector labor relations, the duty to bargain is defined
by section S(d) of the NLRA51 as
the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the
employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, ... but such obligation does not compel either party to agree
to a proposal or require the making of a concession ....

The obligation to negotiate in good faith has been interpreted by
the courts as requiring a duty to participate actively in deliberations
with a sincere desire and intention to reach an agreement.52 Normally, this would encompass give and take on both sides until some
agreement is reached, but there is no legal duty to agree. Furthermore, the NLRA does not preclude an employer from bargaining in
good faith for unilateral control over a matter covered by the duty to
bargain.rm Similarly, the failure to make a counter-proposal is not
a per se violation of the NLRA; 54 however, such a failure, in the
context of the totality of a party's conduct at the bargaining table,
may lead to the inference of bad faith bargaining.55 In essence, the
requirement of good faith bargaining in the private sector is simply
that both parties manifest a type of attitude and conduct which will
be conducive to the reaching of an agreement.
49. 269 S.2d at 687.
50. 269 S.2d at 688.
51. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970).
52. E.g., NLRB v. Montgomery Ward&: Co., 133 F.2d 676, 686 (9th Cir. 1943).
53. NLRB v. American Natl. Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952).
54. NLRB v. Arkansas Rice Growers' Cooperative Assn., 400 F.2d 565, 571 (8th Cir.
1968).
55. NLRB v. General Elec. Co., 418 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
965 (1970).
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The Muddle of Bargaining Models in the Public Sector:
"Meet and Confer" or "Collective Negotiations"

Statutes concerned with public sector bargaining may be divided
into two categories: those providing for "collective negotiations" and
the so-called "meet and confer" statutes. In states, such as Michigan,
which have adopted the collective-negotiations approach, the statutory definition of the duty to bargain is often identical or very
similar to that found in the NLRA.56 It is probably safe to assume
that these statutes were intentionally designed to incorporate by
reference private sector precedents. On this score, it is interesting to
note that the Michigan Employment Relations Commission (MERC)
frequently cites NLRB precedents in deciding cases under that state's
Public Employment Relations Act. 57
Before attempting an appraisal of legislation based on the meetand-confer model, it may be helpful to contrast it with the collectivenegotiations approach presently recognized in the private sector.
"Meet-and-confer negotiations" can be defined as the
process of negotiating terms and conditions of employment intended
to emphasize the differences between public and private employment
conditions. Negotiations under "meet and confer" laws usually imply discussions leading to unilateral adoption of policy by legislative
body rather than written contract, and take place with multiple employee representatives rather than an exclusive bargaining agent.58

This definition fairly describes what was originally intended by the
meet-and-confer standard of bargaining. Implicit in the pure meetand-confer approach is the assumption that the private sector bargaining model would be overly permissive if applied without qualification to the public sector. In other words, it is argued that public
employers should retain broad managerial discretion in the operation of a governmental agency, subject only to the recall of the
electorate. Thus, under the pure meet-and-confer bargaining model,
the outcome of any public employer-employee discussions will depend more on management's determinations than on bilateral decisions by "equals" at the bargaining table. In contrast, the parties in
the private sector meet as equals and are free to negotiate to a point
of impasse all "mandatory" subjects of bargaining-matters concerning wages, hours, and conditions of employment.59
56. See, e.g., MrcH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 423.215 (1967); P.A. STAT. ANN. tit. 43,
(Supp. 1972).
57. See, e.g., Westwood Community Schools, 7 Michigan Employment Relations
Commission Labor Opinions [hereinafter MERC Lab. Op.] 913 (1972).
58. GERR REFER.ENCE FILE 91:02-03 (1970).
59. The parties, however. may not insist that "permissible" subjects be bargained
upon. See text accompanying notes 108-09 infra.
§ ll0l.701
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It is generally assumed that most states which have passed statutes
dealing with public sector labor relations have opted for the collective-negotiations model over the meet-and-confer approach. Close
study of the legislation, however, reveals that this conclusion appears
to be somewhat overdrawn and, at best, misleading. Actually, most
states have rejected the pure meet-and-confer bargaining model, but,
by the same token, most have also rejected the collective-negotiations
approach. In practice, most states have adopted either a modified
meet-and-confer statute, which gives unions more bargaining power
than the pure model, or a modified collective-negotiations statute,
which is more restrictive from the union's viewpoint than its private
sector counterpart. For this reason alone, it is often difficult to distinguish between meet-and-confer and collective-negotiations as viable working concepts in the public sector.
Most critics of meet-and-confer have argued that any bargaining
structure which relegates the employees' representative to the status
of a "conferee" or "discussant," rather than a negotiator, is patently
deficient. But this criticism rests on the assumption that the bargaining process is in fact different under a meet-and-confer, as opposed
to a collective-negotiations, model. However, the recent history of
collective bargaining in the public sector suggests that there is relatively little difference in bargaining tactics or techniques under these
two models. Unions in the public sector have pressed for the same
type of demands and with the same vigor under both models. Moreover, many of the states which have passed meet-and-confer statutes
have so distorted the pure meet-and-confer bargaining model that
it is no longer accurate to say that the parties governed by these
statutes do not meet as "equals."
At last count, seven states-Alabama, California, Idaho, Kansas,
Missouri, Montana, and Oregon-had some form of meet-and-confer
legislation covering various groups of government employees.00 Of
these, only Missouri, Alabama, and California have statutes that
embody the pure meet-and-confer approach. For example, as the
Supreme Court of Missouri ruled in Missey v. City of Cabool, 61 the
Missouri statute does
not purport to give to public employees the right of collective bar60. ALA. CoDE tit. 37, § 450(3) (Supp. 1969); CAL. EDuc. CoDE §§ 13080-90 (West
1969), as amended, (West Supp. 1972) (Winton Act-teachers); CAL. Govr. CODE§§ 352536 (West Supp. 1972) (state employees); CAL. Govr. CODE §§ 3500-ll (West 1966), as
amended, (West Supp. 1972) (Meyers-Milias-Brown Act-other public employees);
lDAHo CoDE §§ 44-1801 to -18ll (Supp. 1971): KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 75-4321 to -4335
(Supp. 1972); Mo. STAT. ANN. §§ 105.500-.530 (Supp. 1973); MONT. R.Ev. CODES ANN.
§§ 75-6ll5 to -6128 (1971); ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 342.440-.480, 342,710-.780 (1971).
61. 441 S.W.2d 35 (Mo. 1969).
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gaining guaranteed ... to employees in private industry . . .. The
act does not constitute a delegation ... to the union of the legislative power of the public body, and therefore ... the prior discretion
in the legislative body to adopt, modify or reject outright the results
of the discussions is untouched...• The act provides only a procedure for communication between the organization selected by public employees and their employer without requiring adoption of any
agreement reached.62

The recently enacted statute covering state employees in California
seems to follow the principles espoused in Missey, for it simply requires the state representatives to "meet and confer" with employee
representatives upon request, and to "consider," as fully as is deemed
reasonable by the government representative, presentations made by
the employee representative. The statute clearly indicates that after
the state has reasonably "considered" union proposals, it may then
act unilaterally with respect to wages, hours, and conditions of employment. 63
While it is plain that in some states, the parties do not meet as
equals at the bargaining table, there are other meet-and-confer jurisdictions in which the matter has not been so neatly resolved. In
Kansas, for example, the duty to meet and confer encompasses more
than a mere exhortation to the public employer to "consider" employees' proposals; it is a mutual obligation to "meet and confer in
order ... to endeavor to reach agreement on conditions of employment."64 Other meet-and-confer statutes state even more explicitly
that the employer's duty goes beyond listening to its employees'
suggestions. For example, the Montana statute makes it an unfair
labor practice for a government employer to refuse to "meet, confer,
or negotiate in good faith." 65
The concept of meeting and conferring in good faith has been
supported by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Rela62. 441 S."W.2d at 41.
63. CAL. Govr. CODE§§ 3525-36 (West Supp. 1972). The act governing teacher negotiations exprwly provides that the final decision is to be made by the public school
employer. CAL. Eouc. CODE § 13088 (West Supp. 1972). Cf. Torrance Educ. Assn. v.
Board of Educ., 21 Cal. App. 2d 589, 98 Cal. Rptr. 639 (1971).
64. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4322(1) (Supp. 1972) (emphasis added). In contrast to the
situation in pure meet-and-confer states, the Kansas public employer cannot implement
proposals unilateraIIy upon reaching impasse. At impasse the Kansas statute calls for
mediation, fact-finding with recommendations, and voluntary arbitration. KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 75-4382 (Supp. 1972). Thus, whatever differences may exist between the duty
to meet and confer as it exists in Kansas and the duty to bargain collectively prior
to impasse, the Kansas procedure on reaching impasse is virtually identical to procedures established in some collective-negotiations states. E.g., HAWAII REv. STAT.§ 89-11
(Supp. 1971); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 179.69(1), 179.72(9)-(11) (Supp. 1973); N.Y. Civ. SERV.
LAW § 209 (McKinney 1973).
65. MoNT. REv. CODE'S ANN. § 75-6120 (1971) (emphasis added).
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tions (ACIR). In a lengthy report, the Commission opted for a modified meet-and-confer approach, which it explained as follows:
"In good faith" has a number of important connotations as it applies to the meet and confer process. It obligates the governmental
employer and a recognized employee organization to approach the
discussion table with an open mind. It underscores the fact that such
meetings should be held at mutually agreeable and convenient times.
It recognizes that a sincere effort should be made by both parties to
reach agreement on all matters falling properly within the discussions' purview. It signifies that both sides will be represented by duly
authorized spokesmen prepared to confer on all such matters.... It
calls for a free exchange to the other party, on request, of non-confidential data pertinent to any issues under discussion. It implies a
joint effort in drafting a non-binding memorandum of understanding setting forth all agreed upon recommendations for submission
to the jurisdiction's appropriate governing officials. It charges the
governmental agent to strive to achieve acceptance and implementation of these recommendations by such officials. It affirms that failure to reach agreement or to make concessions does not constitute
bad faith when real differences of opinion exist. It requires both
parties to be receptive to mediation if bona fide differences of opinion produce an impasse. Finally, it means that the State public labormanagement relations law should list as an unfair practice failure
to meet and confer in good faith, thereby providing a basis for legal
recourse.66

It is noteworthy that the ACIR recommendations, which have
been followed by some states, include the suggestion that the parties
may be required to bargain in "good faith" to a point of impasse.
Surely, if this is a part of the definition of meet and confer, then the
bargaining process is not much different from the collective-negotiations approach.
The apparent distinction between the ACIR modified meet-andconfer approach and the traditional collective-negotiations approach
is the ACIR suggestion that the result of bargaining should be "a
non-binding memorandum of understanding setting forth all agreed
upon recommendations for submission to the jurisdiction's appropriate governing officials." But the requirement of a conditional
agreement does not really distinguish the modified meet-and-confer
states from some states which have followed the collective-negotiations model. Under the New York Taylor Act, 67 it is provided that
any labor agreement between a public employer and a union must
66• .ADVISORY
ICIES FOR STATE

CoMMN.
& LoCAL

ON !NTERGOVERNllf:ENTAL RELAUONS, LABOR·MANAGE:\IENT POL·
GoVERNME?-.'TS 102 (1969).

67. N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW§§ 200-14 (McKinney 1973).
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include, "in type not smaller than the largest type used elsewhere
in the agreement," the following clause:
It is agreed ... that any provision of this agreement requiring legislative action to permit its implementation by amendment of law or
by providing the additional funds therefor, shall not become effective until the appropriate legislative body has given approval.68
Thus, even in New York, which has one of the most comprehensive
collective-negotiations statutes, the end product of bargaining may
be nothing more than a conditional agreement.69
The curious mixture of statutory schemes used to define the duty
to bargain in the public sector probably just reflects the initial
reluctance of state legislatures to adopt the private sector bargaining
model in toto. However, some of this legislative reticence is beginning to mellow. Minnesota and Alaska recently shunned meet-andconfer language in newly adopted statutes,70 and the word "negotiate" was recently substituted for the word "confer" in the South
Dakota statute.71
C.

The Varying Bargaining Rights for Different Classes
of Public Employees

In the preceding discussion of how the bargaining process varies
from state to state, it has been assumed that each state has adopted
the same bargaining procedures for all public employees. Actually,
some state legislatures have grouped public employees into several
classes for the purposes of defining bargaining rights, and each class
tends to be burdened with its own restrictions. For example, the
scope of state employee bargaining is often restricted in deference
to pre-existing civil service laws.72 In the case of municipal employees, a concern for home rule has produced some statutes that
cover municipal employees only at local option.73 In addition to state
and municipal employees, other groups, such as policemen and firemen, teachers, and miscellaneous employees (nurses, noncertificated
68. N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 204-a(l) (McKinney 1973).
69. See also text accompanying notes 99-101 infra.
70. A.LA.s. STAT. §§ 23.40.070-.260 (1972); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 179.61-.77 (Supp. 1973).
71. S.D. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 3-18-2 (Supp. 1972).
72. CAL. GOVT. CoDE §§ 3500 (West 1966), 3525 (West Supp. 1972); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 75-4330 (Supp. 1972); ME. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 969 (Supp. 1972); MAss. ANN.
LAws ch. 149, § 1781 (Supp. 1972); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.703 (Supp. 1972); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 905 (1972); WASH. R.Ev. CODE § 41.56.100 (1969); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ lll.91(2)(b) (Supp. 1973).
73. E.g., CAL. Go\T. CoDE §§ 3500-11 (West 1966), as amended, (West Supp. 1972);
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 75-4321 to -4335 (Supp. 1972); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 243.711-.795 (1971).

900

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 71:885

employees of school districts, etc.) are frequently singled out for special treatment.
The class of public employees most often differentiated from the
others is teachers. As noted hereafter, some state statutes reflect the
view that certain professional employees-administrators, technicians, and scientists, but primarily teachers-are valuable resource
personnel and that they should therefore be available for consultation on policy matters, in a nonadversary situation, lest their expertise be lost to the public employer. As a consequence, some statutes
not only seek to protect the right of these employees to bargain with
respect to what are traditionally viewed as mandatory subjects of
bargaining, but also preserve for these employees the right to discuss
other matters which, absent statutory provisions, would be either
wholly within the discretion of the public employer or not a mandatory subject of bargaining. Under the new Minnesota public employee relations statute,74 for example, all public employees have the
right to "meet and negotiate" with respect to terms and conditions
of employment,75 while "professional employees" have the additional right to "meet and confer" . . . over items not defined as
"terms and conditions of employment." 76 Minnesota is unique in
its bifurcation of the duty to bargain in a single statute. Several
other states have separate statutes designed to narrow the scope of
bargaining for professionals so as to avoid adversary confrontations
on policy issues.71
The type of bargaining authorized for teachers is often given the
name "professional negotiations." However, the use of this term may
be meaningless as a practical matter. For example, in the Kansas
statute applying to teachers,78 "professional negotiations" has virtually the same meaning as does the modified meet-and-confer obligation, discussed above,79 which covers other public employees. Similarly, in Vermont, "professional negotiations" is defined to mean
"meeting, conferring, consulting, discussing and negotiating." 80 Thus
the term may merely reflect the attempts by some state legislatures
to avoid traditional collective bargaining in situations involving
professional employees.
74. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 179.61-.77 (Supp. 1973).
75. MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 179.65(4) (Supp. 1973).
76. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 179.65(3), 179.73 (Supp. 1973).
77. E.g., NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 79-1278 to -1295 (Supp. 1969); ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 342.440.480 (1971 ).
78. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-5413 to -5425 (Supp. 1972).
79. See note 64 supra and accompanying text.
80. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 1981(2) (Supp. 1972) (emphasis added).
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The trend in state legislation away from the initial flirtation with
meet-and-confer is not yet complete. Even as they amend legislation
to conform more generally to the dominant collective-negotiations
model, some state legislatures continue to cling to the notion that
there ought to be some differences between the public and private
sectors with respect to the nature of the duty to bargain. It is not
clear, however, that legislative attempts to preserve the remnants
of a limited bargaining model in the context of over-all liberaliza•
tion will have any practical effect on the behavior of the parties at
the bargaining table.

D. Exclusive Representation
As part of the liberalizing trend with respect to the bargaining
process, most states now accept the principle of exclusive representation. However, one state supreme court has held that exclusive
representation violates the employee's right to refrain from joining a
union. 81 The only other major exception to the exclusive representation principle is the California Winton Act82 (covering public school
teachers), which provides for proportional representation of employee groups through "negotiating councils." The California court
of appeals has held in two cases that employee groups may not be
recognized or negotiate except through these councils.83 But even in
California there is movement away from proportional representation; the exclusive representation principle has been incorporated
in recent amendments to the Meyers-Millias-Brown Act,84 which
applies to local employees.

E.

The Impact of the "Sunshine Laws"

An interesting problem with respect to the process of bargaining
results from the conflict of the government's duty to conduct business
openly with the practical requirement that collective bargaining
discussions be conducted with some privacy. In Florida, for example,
the so-called "Sunshine Law" 85 requires that all meetings of state
agencies be open to the public. Thus, in Bassett v. Braddock,86 the
Florida supreme court was faced with the question of whether a
81. Dade County Classroom Teachers' Assn. v. Ryan, 225 S.2d 903 (Fla. 1969).
82. CAL. EDuc. CoDE §§ 13080-88 (West 1969), as amended, (West Supp. 1972).
8!!. West Valley Fedn. of Teachers v. Campbell Union High School Dist., 24 Cal.
App. 3d 297, 101 Cal. Rptr. 83 (1972); California Fedn. of Teachers v. Oxnard Elementary Schools, 272 Cal. App. 2d 514, 77 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1969).
84. CAL. Govr. CoDE §§ 3500-11 (West 1966), as amended, (West Supp. 1972).
85. FLA STAT. ANN. § 286.0ll (Supp. 1972).
86. 262 S.2d 425 {Fla. 1972).
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negotiator for a county board of education could participate in private negotiations with representatives of a teachers' union without
violating the Sunshine Law. The court determined that technical
compliance with the law was achieved when the board, at a public
meeting, voted on and approved, with modifications, the negotiator's
recommendations. In holding that the law did not apply to preliminary deliberations and discussions, the court sustained the view of
the Dade County circuit court that "meaningful collective bargaining in the circumstances here would be destroyed if full publicity
were accorded at each step of the negotiations." 87
Even if preliminary negotiations may be held in secret, laws
requiring public employers to conduct public meetings raise another
interesting question: Must a public employer allow the representative of a minority union to make a presentation at a public meeting,
and, if so, does this constitute unlawful "negotiating" with a minority representative in derogation of the rights of the exclusive representative? The Wisconsin supreme court dealt with this issue in
Board of School Directors v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission.88 The court held that such a presentation, if made on behalf
of a minority organization, did constitute unlawful "negotiating."
Under the school board's regulations a minority-union representative
87. 262 S.2d at 426. "Sunshine" or "right-to-know" laws are not universal. Where
they do exist, reconciliation between the open meeting principle and collective bargaining is usually achieved without a court battle. For example, according to the
Massachusetts attorney general, that state's "right-to-know" law, MASS. ANN. LAws
ch. 39, § 23A (1966), as amended, (Supp. 1971), does not apply to collective bargaining
sessions. [1967-1968] MAss. ATrY. GEN. REP. 92.
In Wisconsin, the attorney general has stated:
Whether the teacher salary proposals submitted by the teachers' committee
and the counter proposals made by the school board are preliminary in nature
and for bargaining reasons need to be discussed in a closed session is basically a
question of fact to be decided by the school board. If the board finds that the bargaining process can best be carried on in private, the meeting may be closed.•••
[However,] [w]hen the bargaining period is past, no final action should be taken
on the teachers' salary schedule until they are [sic] made public and discussed in
an open public meeting.
1965 WIS. ATrY. GEN. OP. at vi.
California's open-meeting statute, CAL. GoVT. CODE §§ 54950-60 (West 1966), as
amended, (West Supp. 1972), provides that secret meetings can be held under certain
circumstances. And in New York, the Commissioner of Education determined as
early as 1951 that school boards would be permitted to hold executive sessions so long
as official actions were taken only at regular sessions. D. WoLI.E'IT &: R. CHANIN, THE
LAW AND PRAcnCE OF TEACHER NEGOTIATIONS 4:3-4 (1970). While the relation between
open-meeting statutes and collective bargaining is still cloudy in some areas, the Florida
experience appears unlikely to be repeated with any great frequency elsewhere.
For discussions of the constitutional dimensions of sunshine laws, see generally
Parks, The Open Government Principle: Applying the Right To Know Under the Constitution, 26 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1 (1957); Note, Open Meeting Statutes: The Press
Fights for the "Right To Know," 75 HARV. L. REv. 1199, 1200-03 (1962).
88. 42 Wis. 2d 637, 168 N.W.2d 92 (1969).
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could speak on his own behalf, though not in his representative
capacity; thus, the court managed to sidestep the troublesome free
speech and right-of-petition questions which might flow from a public
employer's unyielding refusal to hear third-party public expressions
concerning a pending negotiation.
In September 1972, the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission (WERC) confronted this issue in a more direct fashion. In
Madison Teachers, Inc. v. Joint School District No. 8,89 WERC
held that the Madison board of education violated its duty to bargain
when it heard a minority representative who addressed a public
meeting of the board concerning a "fair-share" (agency shop) agreement, which was being negotiated by the board and the majority
union. WERC ruled that the board was not entitled to hear arguments against fair-share agreements until after a specific agreement
had been negotiated and only the question of the acceptance of the
negotiated agreement by the employees remained. The Commission
specifically rejected the contention that this constituted a denial of
the minority representative's constitutional rights. The board, it
said, had other ways to receive the information presented by the
minority representative without violating its duty to bargain, including hearing presentations at times other than during negotiations
with the exclusive representative of the unit. This decision is consistent with a fundamental principle of labor relations: in order to
gain the rights associated with exclusive representation, employees
must accept limitations on other rights, including the right to negotiate with the employer individually or through representatives of
employee groups other than the one chosen by a majority of employees.00

F. Determining Who the Public "Employer" Is: The Impact
of the Political Process
Questions relating to the exclusive representation principle and
the impact of the Sunshine Laws pale by comparison to the problem
of attempting to identify the real public "employer" in any given
public sector negotiations.91 Should the executive branch, which has
over-all responsibility for the bureaucracy, be designated as the em89. GERR No. 483, at B-3 (Case VIII, No. 15210 MP-107, Dec. No. ll271, Sept. 13,
1972).
90. See, e.g., NLRB v. Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd., 419 F.2d 216 (1969). See generall)'
Oldham, Organized Labor, the Environment, and the Taft-Hartley Act, 71 MICH. L.
REV. 935, 1010-17 (1973).
91. See Blair, supra note 45, at 8-10.
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ployer? Or does that title belong to the legislature, which appropriates
the money and approves the financial terms of contracts? What role
should the personnel division of a civil service system play?
These questions take on great practical importance when the
state statute provides sanctions for a refusal to bargain in good faith.
One element of good faith bargaining is the presence of bargaining
representatives on both sides of the negotiating table who have the
authority to make genuine proposals. Of course, final authority need
not be possessed by negotiators for either side; for example, it is an
accepted practice in the private sector for union representatives to
submit a contract for final ratification by the membership before
execution. A different situation, however, is faced by public employees when the representative of the public employer lacks even
the authority to arrive at a conditional agreement. Absent a statute
clearly identifying the participants on the public employer's side
of the bargaining table, the question must be resolved on a case-bycase basis. A public employee relations board could serve a vital
function in this area, by shaping the collective bargaining process
through unfair labor practice proceedings.92
A good example of the usefulness of the case-by-case method of
establishing the identity of the employer is seen in Typographical
Union v. Personnel Division,93 decided by the Oregon Public Employee Relations Board (PERB). When the state personnel division
refused to recommend approval of the wage adjustments called for
in a joint agreement between state printing trade employees and the
state printer, an unfair labor practice charge was filed. Even though
a contract approved by the personnel division would still be subject
92. Resolution of bargaining disputes by an administrative body such as a public
employment relations board is preferable to resolution by the courts for two reasons.
First, the procedure is usually speedier and less expensive, and the law, therefore, tends
to develop faster. The speed with which disputes are resolved is more important in
labor relations than in ordinary civil proceedings, for a labor-management dispute,
unlike the typical civil action, is only part of an ongoing relation. Moreover, speedy
resolution is desirable not only to settle current disputes and avoid the disruption and
disharmony resulting from such actions as strikes, lockouts, and boycotts, but also to
clarify the rights of the parties with respect to their future dealings.
A second reason in favor of using public employment relation boards to resolve
disputes is that members of these boards are often experts in labor relations. As
specialists who are constantly dealing with various facets of their specialty, they are
better prepared to deal with the concepts that they are expected to apply than are
judges, who are often without any labor relations expertise and who deal with labor
cases only sporadically. Labor relations, especially in the public sector, involves public
policy considerations as well as technical questions of law. But the role of the courts
in resolving public policy questions in this area is better preserved in judicial review
of administrative proceedings than in providing an initial forum,
93. GERR No. 400, at B-6 (Case No. C-39, March 31, 1971). For a discussion of this
case in the context of delegation of power and scope of bargaining problems, see Blair,
supra note 45, at 11-15.
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to final approval by the governor and the making of the necessary
appropriations by the legislature, the Oregon PERB held that the
personnel division should have participated in the bargaining process
rather than waiting to reject the completed agreement, because the
state, as well as the state agencies, is a "public employer" by definition
under the Oregon statute.94
The Oregon Board quite properly took a functional approach
in defining the relation between the employees and the component
parts of the employer's authority structure. The Board stressed that
"individuals engaged in the actual bargaining process must be persons empowered to present the facts ... in support of their own position and to weigh and evaluate the arguments ... presented by their
colleagues across the table." 95 The fact that the Oregon statute
contemplates only a conditional agreement did not, in the Board's
view, eliminate the employer's obligation to develop a bargaining
approach common to all elements of the bureaucracy having an
input into the process. The Board noted specifically that "[t]here is
nothing to prevent the parties from negotiating to a point at which
the governor has either accepted or not accepted a proffered agreement."06
Only recently has a state legislature addressed itself to the
problem of identifying the employer of state employees. The revised
Wisconsin statute provides that "the state shall be considered as a
single employer ... [and that] [i]t is the responsibility of the executive branch to negotiate collective bargaining agreements, and to
administer such agreements. . . .'' 97 The statute also spells out the
responsibility for the handling of employer functions within the
executive branch and for the coordination of collective bargaining
activities.98 Finally, the Wisconsin law makes it clear that the legislature must take specific steps to approve or disapprove those portions
of agreements which require legislative action.99 Statutes of this type
should help to eliminate the frustration and waste of time and money
which occur in those all-too-frequent instances where a union concludes an agreement only to find that it has been dealing with an
agency with insufficient authority to negotiate effectively.
While the Wisconsin statute states in detail the tasks that the
Wisconsin legislature must perform in public sector bargaining, it
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

ORE, REV. STAT. § 243.711(5) (1971).
GERR No. 400, at B-7.
GERR No. 400, at B-7.
Wrs. STAT. ANN. § lll.81(16) (Supp. 1973).
Wrs. STAT. ANN.§§ 111.80(4), 111.81(16) (Supp. 1973).
Wrs. STAT. ANN. § 111.92 (Supp. 1973).
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also brings out the fact that the role of the legislature in the bargaining process is conceptually ambiguous, absent a statute. On the
one hand, the state legislature, or its equivalent in a political subdivision, although it is the final legitimating authority, at least for
fiscal matters, is wholly outside the negotiating process, which is
completed before the legislature is called upon to act. On the other
hand, the need for legislative approval necessarily affects the bargaining process. For example, the bargaining position of the employer is likely to be strengthened if the parties believe that the
legislature will not approve settlements beyond a certain percentage
or dollar increase over present benefits.
The Wisconsin statute provides an example of how the legislature
may not only legitimate public sector contracts, but also participate
more directly in the bargaining process. It requires that agreements,
once approved by the unions involved, be approved by a joint
legislative committee. The committee then introduces bills in both
houses to implement those portions of the agreement, such as wage
adjustments and fringe benefits, which require legislative approval.
If the committee rejects the agreement, or the legislature rejects
the resultant bills, the agreement is sent back to the parties for
renegotiation.100 Thus, the parties must remain aware of the attitudes of both the legislative committee and the legislature itself.101
Participation by the legislature in the bargaining process raises
the question whether a legislative body can be regarded as the
"employer." The legislature, as approving authority, is a part of the
same government as the executive branch, which acts as the negotiating authority. May the executive be regarded as the "agent" of the
legislature, in the sense that it has actual authority to negotiate
only those contracts which the legislature will approve? Should the
executive be charged with actual or constructive knowledge of legislative tolerance limits, and should both the executive and the legislature be subject to unfair labor practice charges if the executive
negotiates a contract knowing the legislature will disapprove it?
These interesting questions were raised with respect to a local
legislative body in a recent decision by the New York Public Employment Relations Board. In Board of Trustees of the Ulster County
100. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.92(1) (Supp. 1973).
101. In this respect, the role of the Wisconsin legislature is to be contrasted with
that of its New York counterpart. The provision of the Taylor Law requiring legislative
approval of the negotiated contract, N.Y. Crv. SERV. LAw § 204-a(l) (McKinney 1973),
involves a significantly lower level of legislative participation in the process than the
Wisconsin statute provides.
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Community College,102 the college board of trustees agreed to a wage
hike in excess of the maximum raise authorized by the county legislature. The legislature then repudiated the authority of the trustees
and sought to renegotiate the contract. The hearing officer found that
the trustees had in fact exceeded their authority; however, he found
that the legislature had committed an improper practice in renouncing the authority of the board and rejecting the contract. By
reference to agency principles, the hearing officer determined that
the act of the agent (the trustees) should be attributed to the principal (the legislature) where the agent is clothed with apparent
authority to negotiate an agreement. This finding of an improper
practice was rejected by the New York PERB, on the ground that an
agent should be free to agree to a proposal in excess of his authority
if he has the good faith belief that his principal may be persuaded to
agree also. The decision by the Board did not reject the agency concept, however, and left open the possibility that the Board may return
in later cases to the view expressed by the hearing officer that where
a legislative body directly involves itself in the negotiating process,
such action is reviewable by the Board and may be the subject of an
improper practice proceeding. In an earlier New York decision, in
which the legislative body did involve itself in the negotiating
process, a hearing officer ruled that only the executive branch could
be charged with an improper practice since only that branch, and
not the corresponding legislature, actually "negotiates."103
The Ulster County Community College case dealt with the role
of a local legislative body in the bargaining process. Different questions are raised when dealing with state legislatures. County and
municipal governments, even where "home rule" statutes grant considerable freedom of action to localities, are agencies of the state,
subject to the superior authority of the state government.104 State
courts, therefore, have more freedom to evaluate the behavior of local
legislative bodies according to the dictates of state law than they have
to challenge the state legislature on its own ground. Attribution of
"employer" status to the state legislature for the purpose of enforcing
its own laws against itself is unlikely. But the fact that the legislature may not be a designated participant in the bargaining process
does not alter the reality of its influence on that process.
102. 4 New York Public Employment Relations Board (hereinafter N.Y. PERBJ
4639 (1971) (hearing officer's decision); 4 N.Y. PERB 3749 (1971) (board decision).
103. Town of Huntington, 3 N.Y. PERB 4501 (1970).
104. E. STASON 8: P. ~UPER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TIIE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPO·
RATIONS 2 (3d ed. 1959).
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Clearly, the nature of government requires that adjustments be
made in adapting private sector patterns to public sector negotiations. But these adjustments need not require a wholly different
approach to the process. One major problem at present is simply
definitional-deciding who the proper parties to the negotiations
actually are in any given case. Solutions will come in time through
statutory clarification and ad hoc determinations.
A second major problem-the requirement of legislative approval of fiscal matters-is one to which the parties themselves can
adjust, just as employers in the private sector have adjusted to the
fact that a contract normally is not final until ratified by the union
membership. Statutory provisions such as those found in New York
and Wisconsin should help the parties to remain aware of the need
for such an adjustment.
VI.

THE SCOPE OF BARGAINING

From the foregoing discussion, it can be seen that there are
numerous troublesome issues yet to be resolved concerning the
process of collective bargaining in the public sector. While these
issues are not insignificant, more important are the questions related
to the range of legally permissible subjects about which the parties
may meet and confer or negotiate in the public sector. If, as hereinabove suggested, there is no real difference in the technique of bargaining under most meet-and-confer and collective-negotiations laws,
then the crucial inquiry must involve the scope of bargaining under
either approach. And even if the process of bargaining differs between meet-and-confer and collective-negotiations states (because the
parties negotiate as "equals" only under the latter approach), we are
still not told much about the effective scope of bargaining in the
states which have opted for the collective-negotiations approach. A
state statutory requirement that the parties negotiate as "equals" will
be insignificant if the statute also narrowly limits the scope of bargaining. To promise the government employee equality at the
bargaining table while at the same time excluding most items relating
to wages, hours, and working conditions from the mandatory subjects
of bargaining would make collective bargaining for the public sector
an illusory gain indeed.
A. "Mandatory" and "Permissive" Subjects
In the private sector, the scope of bargaining is derived from the
words "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment,"
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found in section 8(d) of the NLRA. 105 Subjects covered by this
phrase are deemed to be mandatory, and the employer must bargain
with respect to them.100 Other matters are either permissive or
illegal subjects of bargaining.107 Bargaining with respect to permissive subjects is discretionary for both parties,1°8 and neither is
required to bargain in good faith to the point at which agreement or
impasse is reached.109 The parties are not explicitly forbidden from
discussing matters which are illegal subjects of bargaining, but a
contract provision embodying an illegal subject is, of course, unenforceable.110
In the public sector, the NLRA language is frequently incorporated in state statutes to establish the broad outlines of the scope
of bargaining. State courts and public employment relations boards
have likewise frequently relied upon the mandatory-permissive-illegal
distinction, although the distinction probably has little relevance in
the pure meet-and-confer states, where the employer's duty to consider any proposal is not very great. The public sector differs greatly
from the private sector, however, in the method by which this
distinction is delineated. In the private sector, the line between
mandatory and permissive subjects of bargaining is drawn on an ad
hoc basis, as the NLRB and the courts subject the distinction to
constant redefinition and refinement. In the public sector, there is
an attempt to accomplish much more by statute, generally in the form
of specific restrictions on the subject matter of bargaining. In some
cases, state statutes exclude specific matters from the category of
105. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970).
106. NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
107. Normally, the courts and the NLRB have held that unless a subject is likely
to have a significant impact on the job rights and security of an employee, it will not
be covered by the duty to bargain. Indeed, some "business decisions" are not covered
by the duty to bargain even though they may have a real impact on employees' job
interests. E.g., UAW v. NLRB, 470 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1972); NLRB v. Adams Dairy,
Inc., 350 F.2d 108 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1011 (1966). However, the effect
of a business decision-such as a decision to move a plant operation or to contract out
bargaining unit work-on employees may be held to be negotiable. E.g., General Motors
Corp., 191 N.L.R.B. No. 149, 77 LR.R.M. 1537 (1971), petition for review denied sub
nom. UAW v. NLRB, 470 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
108. NLRB v. American Natl. Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952).
109. NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958). At least one
state has adopted this rule in the public sector as well. In Mayor Samuel E. Zoll, GERR
No. 485, at B-5 (Case No. MUP-309, Dec. 14, 1972), the Massachusetts Labor Relations
Commission held that the city's insistence on "public view" bargaining as a precondition to agreement was a failure to bargain in good faith. See note 87 supra for a
discussion of the applicability of the Massachusetts "right-to-know" law. See also Town
of Stratford, Dec. No. 1069 (Conn. St. Bd. Lab. Rel., May 26, 1972), discussed in note
151 infra.
110. NLRB v. National Maritime Union, 175 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1949).
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mandatory subjects of bargaining;111 presumably, however, these
matters are still bargainable on a permissive basis. In other cases,
public employers are forbidden altogether from bargaining about
certain listed subjects.112 In Wisconsin, the State Employment Labor
Relations Act contains both types of restrictions.113
B.

The Impact of Pre-Existing Legislation and
Civil Service Laws

Other statutory provisions restrict the scope of bargaining by
giving precedence to pre-existing state law or municipal ordinance
over a subsequent collective bargaining agreement. For example, the
Massachusetts municipal employee bargaining statute provides: "In
the event that any part or provision of any such agreement is in
conflict with any law, ordinance, or by-law, such law, ordinance, or
by-law shall prevail so long as such conflict remains . . . ." 114 Particularly important among pre-existing laws which may conflict with
collective bargaining agreements are civil service statutes and regulations. Nine statutes in eight states apparently give precedence to
civil service systems over collective bargaining agreements.1115 In two
states the collective bargaining agreement is given precedence.116 In
Michigan, where the public employee bargaining statute117 makes no
mention of precedence, the state supreme court has ruled that those
provisions of local civil service laws covering mandatory subjects
of bargaining are superseded pro tanto by the Michigan Public Employees Relations Act.118 Whether this ruling will influence other
states where the statutes do not contain a rule of precedence remains
to be seen.
Arguably, of course, a rule of precedence deals with the enforcement of the· completed agreement and not with the scope of bargaining per se. But such a rule certainly has an impact on the scope
of bargaining. It may seriously impair the bargaining process if the
111. E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.702 (Supp. 1972).
112. E.g., HAWAII R.Ev. STAT. § 89-9(d) (Supp. 1971).
113. WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.90, lll.91(2)(a)-(b) (Supp. 1973).
114. MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 149, § 1781 (Supp. 1972).
115. CAL. GOVT. CODE §§ 3500 (West 1966), 3525 (West Supp. 1972); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 75-4330 (Supp. 1972); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 969 (Supp. 1972); MAss. ANN.
LAws ch. 149, § 1781 (Supp. 1972); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.703 (Supp. 1972); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 905 (1972); WASH. REV. CODE § 41.56.100 (1969); WIS. STAT. ANN,
§ lll.91(2)(b) (Supp. 1973).
116. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-467 to .477 (1972); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 89,I to -20
(Supp. 1971).
117. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 423.201-.216 (1967).
118. Civil Serv. Commn. v. Wayne County Bd. of Supervisors, 384 Mich. 363, 184
N.W.2d 201 (1971).

April 1973]

Public Sector Bargaining

911

public employer believes that certain subjects in issue are not
"mandatory" items covered by the duty to bargain. In other words,
a public employer presumably will seek to avoid bargaining over
matters covered by civil service laws, especially if inundated with a
host of other union demands, on the plausible ground that any agreements reached in these areas would be unenforceable because of conflicting civil service rules.
Problems associated with the duty to bargain in the public sector
are already too numerous to be compounded by overly broad and
inconsistent civil service regulations. While the civil service system
was originally designed to favor workers by eliminating patronage
and rewarding merit, it has gradually expanded to a point where
many systems now cover other aspects of employee relations not
essentially related to the merit principle. In other words, the civil
service system for many years filled the gap caused by the lack of
public sector bargaining. Now that this gap has been filled, a conflict has arisen between the civil service system and the duty to
bargain in the public sector. It is fairly clear that if the collective
bargaining process is going to have any value at all, the civil service
system in its broad expanded form must yield to bargaining. Thus,
it may well be that civil service should control, at the utmost, only
hiring, promotions, and demotions.
Civil service laws are not the only source of conflict with collective
bargaining legislation. Of the other statutes which limit the scope of
bargaining, the most interesting, in view of recent developments in
Michigan, are the municipal "home rule" statutes. A tug-of-war has
recently developed between the Michigan courts and the Michigan
Employment Relations Commission over the extent to which municipal residency requirements, passed pursuant to the state's Home
Rule Cities Act,119 can restrict the scope of mandatory bargaining.
A number of Michigan cities, including Detroit and Pontiac, have
passed ordinances requiring certain city employees to reside within
the city limits. The principal opposition to these ordinances has
come from police officers, and local police officers' associations have
placed the ordinances high on their priority lists for negotiations
with city officials. The issue has thus been joined: the right of
municipalities to require a commitment to the city on the part of
certain employees is pitted against the right of those employees to
attempt to negotiate a relaxation of that commitment.
In 1970, the Michigan Employment Relations Commission first
dealt with the home rule statute, in City of Flint (Hurley Hospi119. MICH, Co:MP, LAws ANN, §§ 117.1-.38 (1967), as amended, (Supp. 1972).
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tal),120 holding that home rule charter provisions which outlined a
uniform pay plan did not relieve the city of the duty to bargain over
wages. The following year, in City of Detroit (DPOA), 121 MERC
held that the institution of a residency requirement for current employees was a mandatory subject of bargaining. In the meantime, the
Michigan supreme court, apparently without considering the effect
of its decisions on collective bargaining, was hearing challenges to
the constitutionality of such residency requirements. In Williams v.
Detroit Civil Service Commission 122 and Detroit Police Officers Association v. City of Detroit,123 the court held that such requirements
were constitutional and within the prerogative of the municipality
to enact and enforce. It was left to the Michigan court of appeals to
decide the effect of these decisions on the scope of bargaining. One
year later, in Detroit Police Officers Association v. City of Detroit,m
that court held, inter alia, that the residency issue was "no longer
mandatorily negotiable." 125 The Michigan Commission, as of this
writing, has had the latest, though probably not the last, word on the
issue. In City of Pontiac (PPOA),12 6 MERC ruled that the city was
required to bargain with the police officers' association regarding a
proposed change in residency requirements. In so doing, MERC
limited the court of appeals decision strictly to its facts. Thus, the
question of the duty to bargain over residency requirements in
Michigan has not been finally resolved.
C. Judicial Limitations on the Scope of Bargaining
Another source of restrictions on the scope of bargaining is
narrow judicial interpretation of statutory language. Just as courts
have been hesitant to impose a duty to bargain on the public employer, so have they been reluctant to give expansive interpretations
to the language governing the scope of bargaining.127 The desire to
avoid illegal delegations of power, as well as the reluctance to permit
employee groups to encroach upon areas entrusted to the discretion
of a political agency are unquestionably valid, if often overstated,
concerns of the court. These concerns are reinforced by legislative
120,
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126,
127.
(1970).

5 MERC Lab. Op. 348 (1970).
6 MERC Lab. Op. 237 (1971).
383 Mich. 507, 176 N.W.2d 593 (1970).
385 Mich. 519, 190 N.W.2d 97 (1971), appeal dismissed, 405 U.S. 950 (1972).
41 Mich. App. 723, 200 N.W.2d 722 (1972).
41 Mich. App. at 728, 200 N.W.2d at 725.
7 MERC Lab. Op. 701 (1972).
See, e.g., Lullo v. Fire Fighters Local 1066, 55 N.J. 409, 440, 262 A.2d 681, 698
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policy statements which virtually mandate a conservative approach to
statutory interpretation.128
Also, statutory deviations from NLRA language have been
viewed as bases for restrictive interpretations. Illustrative of this last
point is the recent Connecticut case of West Hartford Education
Association v. DeCourcy, 129 in which the question was whether a
board of education could be required to bargain with respect to
the length of the school day and the school calendar. Seizing upon
the fact that the Teacher Negotiation Act130 defines the scope of
mandatory bargaining as "salaries and all other conditions of employment,"131 instead of using the NLRA wording which also specifically
mentions "hours," the Connecticut supreme court ruled that hours
of work were not a "condition of employment" under the act.
Unfortunately, many public sector statutory provisions which are
at variance with the private sector model do not make clear the
legislative purpose behind the language modification. Indeed, some
provisions merely appear to reflect the differences in the employment
situation seen in the public sectors, but do not otherwise indicate a
legislative intention to narrow the scope of bargaining. For example,
the Delaware statute covering teachers provides that the public employer has a duty to negotiate in good faith with respect to "salaries,
employee benefits, and working conditions."132 In other state statutes,
however, the language employed is sufficiently ambiguous to make
it unclear whether the scope of bargaining was intentionally defined
to be more narrow than the definition in the NLRA. In Oklahoma,
for instance, teachers and boards of education are required only to
bargain with respect to "items affecting the performance of professional services,"133 and the South Dakota public employee rela128. In Kansas, for example, the legislature adopted the following legislative findings:
[I']here neither is, nor can be, an analogy of status as between public employees
and private employees, in fact or law, because of inherent differences in the
employment relationship arising out of the unique fact that the public employer
was established by and is run for the benefit of all the people and its authority
derives not from contract nor the profit motive inherent in the principle of free
private enterprise, but from the constitution, statutes, civil service rules, regulations and resolutions ••••
• • • [T]he difference between public and private employment is further reflected
in the constraints that bar any abdication or bargaining away by public employers
of their continuing legislative discretion ••••
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 75-4321(4)-(5) (Supp. 1972).
129. -

Conn. - , 295 A.2d 526 (1972).

130. CoNN. GEN. STAT, .ANN. §§ 10-153a to -153h (Supp. 1973).
131. CoNN. GEN. STAT, ANN, § 10-153b (Supp. 1973).
132. DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 14, § 4008(a) (Supp. 1970).
133. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 509.6 (Supp. 1971).
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tions act requires bargaining only on "grievance procedures and
conditions of employment."184
In all these cases, the problem is essentially the same: state courts
and/or public employee relations boards are forced to develop case
law to accommodate the statutory variations. Given the existence of
the familiar NLRA model, which I would argue is sufficiently flexible
to accommodate public service, the continued enactment of these
oddball statutory provisions appears unnecessary. More importantly,
these ambiguous provisions may actually deter peaceful and effective
bargaining. Faced with unfamiliar terms, which purport to define
the subjects of mandatory bargaining, the employer is encouraged·to
test the parameters of the language by refusing to bargain on borderline issues. The prosecution of these court challenges is no less timeconsuming, expensive, or irritating than traditional collective bargaining. Furthermore, even if the employer prevails in a single case,
as in West Hartford, public employees are not likely to cease pressing
their demands at the bargaining table and before the legislature in
areas which they believe affect their employment situation.
D.

Statutory Management-Rights Clauses

Delineating the scope of bargaining is even more difficult where
statutory management-rights clauses and other statutory exclusions
are involved. While the whole thrust of private sector case law is to
define what is bargainable by constant refinement of the term "wages,
hours and conditions of employment," statutory exclusions are attempts to define bargainability in terms of what is not bargainable.
Furthermore, while deviations from NLRA language leave the scope
of bargaining unclear, statutory exclusions create even more confusion. Some state statutes, for instance, provide that the public employer has the unfettered right to "maintain the efficiency of government operations." 185 Others declare that the employer has no duty
to bargain with respect to the mission of the agency186 or matters of
inherent managerial policy.187 It surely is not clear what these terms
mean. A public employer, for example, may claim that anything
done by the agency before the advent of collective bargaining gives
134. S.D. Co:r,ll'. LAws ANN. § 3-18-2 (Supp. 1972).
135. E.g., HAWAII REv. STAT. § 89-9(d) (Supp. 1971); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4326(d)
(Supp. 1972); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 98-C:7 (Supp. 1971); NEV. REv. STAT. § 288.150(2)(e)
{1971).
136. E.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 905(b) (1972); WIS. STAT. ANN. § lll.91(2)(a) (Supp.
1973).
137. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.66(1) (Supp. 1973).
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evidence of the "mission of the agency" or was done to "maintain the
efficiency of government operations." Operationalizing such language
in the context of the objectives of a collective bargaining statute is
not only difficult, it is unnecessary.
The foregoing discussion, however, does not lead to the conclusion that management-rights clauses are insurmountable obstacles
to bargaining. A recent case in the federal service138 suggests that,
over time, ambiguous provisions such as those cited above can be
reconciled to the requirements of good faith bargaining. Executive
Order No. 11,491,139 the basic authority for the bargaining rights of
federal employees, provides in section 12(b)(4) that management
officials of federal agencies retain the right "to maintain the efficiency
of the Government operations entrusted to them."140 The managers
of United States Army Corps of Engineers power plants in Missouri
and Arkansas invoked this clause to justify scheduling "swing shift"
operators in order to avoid payment of overtime and holiday pay to
regular operators in the plants. The Federal Labor Relations Council
(FLRC), established pursuant to Executive Order No. 11,491 to hear
unfair labor practice charges, determined that management had
committed an unfair labor practice when it refused to negotiate
with respect to its scheduling policies. In responding to the invocation
of the management-rights provision, the FLRC stated:
We believe that where otherwise negotiable proposals are involved, the management right in Section 12(b)(4) may not properly
be invoked to deny negotiations unless there is a substantial demonstration by the agency that increased costs or reduced effectiveness
in operations are inescapable and significant and are not offset by
compensating benefits.141

The FLRC may have discovered a method of dealing with statutory management-rights clauses that state public employee relations
boards would do well to adapt. In effect, the FLRC ruled that management is free to invoke reserved-rights provisions at any time, but
a relatively stiff burden will be placed on the employer to show that
such an invocation is not capricious and that negotiations over the
item in question would seriously deter the smooth functioning of the
employer's operations.
138. !BEW Local 2219, GERR No. 482, at A-2 (No. 7IA-46, Fed. Lab. Rel. Council,
Nov. 20, 1972).
I.'.::l. 3 C.F.R. 262 (1973).

140. 3 C.F.R. 269 (1973).
141. GERR No. 482, at A-2 (emphasis added).
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The Expanding Scope of the Duty To Bargain

Actually, the tendency of both meet-and-confer and collectivenegotiations states to limit the scope of bargaining rests on a fear
that institutionalizing private sector practices in the public sector
may ultimately pervert the political process. As the decision regarding allocation of resources in the public sector is a political
rather than merely an economic choice, it has been argued that full
collective bargaining in the public sector may give labor the means
to enforce its will to the detriment of other, less highly organized
suitors for government funds. 142
It cannot, of course, be controverted that, in theory, decisions on
governmental priorities are properly political and should be responsive to the desires of the constituency as a whole rather than the
values of a labor union. Yet, in reality, the process of resource allocation in government is the outcome of a tug-of-war between many
organized interest groups.
Current developments in public sector labor laws indicate that
we may expect to see a widening of the scope of bargaining in all
states. The experience in Michigan furnishes ample evidence that
public sector bargaining can be satisfactorily regulated under the
private sector concept of the duty to bargain. A state public employment relations board is usually quite capable of deciding, on the
basis of private sector precedents and public sector bargaining experiences, which subjects should be deemed "mandatory" for bargaining purposes. The case-by-case decision-making approach on
mandatory subjects is vastly superior to a rigid legislative limitation
on the scope of bargaining, because if experience proves the initial
judgment to be erroneous, it is easier for a state board to reverse itself
than it is to get a modification of a state statute in the legislature.
In this regard, one may ask whether it is ever sensible to attempt
to limit the scope of bargaining by statute. The collective bargaining
process is in part a therapeutic process, and it should permit the
parties to address fully all problems which affect the bargaining
relationship. If the employer is opposed to a given union demand,
he can discuss the problem raised, and then, if appropriate, he can
persist in rejecting it. This is a more satisfactory approach, in terms
of achieving stable and harmonious labor relations, than to have the
employer refuse to discuss an issue in the first instance because it is
legally nonnegotiable. It may be worthwhile to recall the dissent of
142. H.

WELLINGTON &:

R.

WINTER,

supra note 11, at 29-32.
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Justice Harlan in NLRB v. Wooster Division of Borg-Warner,143
where he argued:
The bargaining process should be left fluid, free from intervention
... leading to premature crystallization of labor agreements into any
one pattern of contract provisions, so that these agreements can be
adapted through collective bargaining to the changing needs of our
society and to the changing concepts of the responsibilities of labor
and management.144
At the present time, the predicted trend toward a more liberal
approach to the scope of bargaining in the public sector already
appears to be developing. At the federal level, for example, a "Scope
of Bargaining Project," currently underway at the Civil Service Commission, is preparing proposals for streamlining the Federal Personnel Manual, which is now the source of extensive restrictions on
bargaining in the federal service. Civil Service Commission Chairman
Robert Hampton recently outlined both the nature of these restrictions and the goals of the "Scope of Bargaining Project" in a speech
before the Personnel Directors' Conference of the Federal Executive
Institute, as follows:
The legal limitations which are imposed on the scope of bargaining in the Federal sector by "applicable laws and regulations"
account for the significant and fundamental differences from labormanagement relations in private industry. Many of the basic terms
and conditions of employment which typically are fashioned by the
collective bargaining process in the private sector are determined by
law or regulation in the Federal sector. These include:
-Basic economic items such as pay, hours, certain fringe benefits
and retirement.
-Fundamental personnel policies such as merit staffing, job classification, performance rating and layoff.
-Protection of individual job security such as through statutory
appeal rights to the Civil Service Commission.
The Objective of the Scope of Bargaining project is to remove
barriers in the [Federal Personnel Manual] to negotiations, not to
determine what is negotiable or to come up with a laundry list of
negotiable items. Instead, the project is designed to (I) pin-point
[Civil Service Commission] policies and regulations that might be undesirably restrictive, and (2) suggest how they might be changed to
broaden or remove uncertainty about the scope of bargaining in the
Federal Service.145
143. 356 U.S. 342 (1957).
144. 356 U.S. at 358-59.
145. Remarks of Civil Service Commission Chairman Robert Hampton, 1972 Con-
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At the state level, the public employment relations boards and
courts in several states, notably Michigan, New York, ·wisconsin,
and Pennsylvania, have been in the forefront of the movement toward expanded public sector bargaining. In 1972, the New York
court of appeals, in a landmark decision, Board of Education v.
Associated Teachers of Huntington, 146 ruled that, in light of the
Taylor Act147 (governing public sector bargaining generally), a school
board had authority to enter into a collective bargaining agreement
granting benefits to teachers, even though there was no specific statutory authorization to do so. In reaching this result, the court stated
that
the validity of a provision found in a collective agreement negotiated by a public employer turns upon whether it constitutes a term
or condition of employment. If it does, then, the public employer
must negotiate as to such term or condition and, upon reaching an
understanding, must incorporate it into the collective agreement unless some statutory provision circumscribes its power to do so.
• . . Under the Taylor Law, the obligation to bargain as to all
terms and conditions of employment is a broad and unqualified one,
and there is no reason why the mandatory provision of that act
should be limited, in any way, except in cases where some other applicable statutory provision explicitly and definitely prohibits the
public employer from making an agreement as to a particular term
or condition of employment.148
Notwithstanding the importance of the New York court's decision, most of the progress in defining the scope of bargaining in the
public sector is an accomplishment of state labor boards.149 By far,
the class of public employees who have most actively sought to test
the scope of mandatory bargaining before state boards has been the
public school teachers, and it is in this area that the boards have made
ference of Directors of Personnel, Federal Executive Institute, Charlottesville, Va. (April,
1972), excerpted in GERR No. 450, at E-1, E-2, E-4 (May 1, 1972).
146. 30 N.Y.2d 122, 282 N.E.2d 109, 331 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1972).
147, N.Y. C1v. SERV. LAw §§ 200-14 (McKinney 1973).
148. 30 N.Y.2d at 127, 129, 282 N.E.2d at 112-13, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 21, 23 (emphasis
added).
149. There are two types of state labor boards in the public sector: those dealing
with both private and public sector questions and those handling only public sector
matters. There are small but sometimes significant differences in the decisions which
emanate from each type of board. Boards which deal with both sectors are more willing
to follow private sector precedents than boards which deal only with the public sector.
For example, the Michigan Employment Relations Commission, which hears cases from
both sectors, is inclined to be more generous in upholding a union's right to bargain
with respect to any particular question than is the New York Public Employment Relations Board, whose jurisdiction is more limited. Compare City of Detroit, 3 MERC Lab.
Op. 492 (1968), with West Irondequoit Bd. of Educ., 4 N.Y. PERB 3725, affd. on rehearing, 4 N.Y. PERB 3753 (1971).

April 1973]

Public Sector Bargaining

919

the greatest expansion of the scope of bargaining. One of the first
cases which suggested that the scope of management discretion over
educational policy is not as broad as had been previously thought
was a Michigan trial examiner's decision in North Dearborn Heights
School District.160 Before the case was ultimately settled, the examiner
caused a bit of a furor in Michigan education circles by holding all
fourteen of the submitted issues to be bargainable, including curriculum, classroom schedules and class sizes, selection of textbook
materials, and a number of other subjects formerly thought to be
within the exclusive discretion of the board of education. While no
labor board decision has gone as far since, the fear that collective
bargaining over some of these matters may lead to abdication of the
school board's responsibility and a loss of local control over schools
has apparently lessened. Increasingly, formerly permissive or forbidden subjects have become mandatory. The Pennsylvania Labor
Relations Board recently reversed an earlier decision by holding that
five of twenty-one formerly nonbargainable subjects were negotiable
and that the other sixteen "may be bargainable.'' 161
Public education provides an excellent environment for the
development of the case-by-case method of defining the scope of
bargaining. Such matters as the length of the school day, the academic
calendar, classroom size, and extra-curricular assignments clearly relate to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.
150. 1 MERC Lab. Op. 434 (1966). Compare Aberdeen Educ. Assn. v. Aberdeen Bd.
of Educ., 82 L.R.R.M. 2287 (S.D. Cir. Ct. 1972). In that case, the Aberdeen Education
Association submitted a list of fifteen items for negotiation. The board of education
replied with a list of four items, refusing to negotiate on such items as elementary
conferences, teachers' aides, class size, audio-visual expansion, school-wide guidance and
counseling programs, mandatory retirement of administrators, elementary planning
periods, and budget allowances. A South Dakota circuit court upheld the board's refusal, ruling that these were not proper subjects for bargaining.
151. State College Area School Dist., GERR No. 464, at B-2 (Case No. PERA-C-929-C,
June 26, 1972), The scope of mandatory bargaining may include not only substantive
issues, but also "procedural" questions that have to do with the conduct of negotiations. This point was recently made by the Connecticut State Board of Labor Relations,
in Town of Stratford, Dec. No. 1069 (May 26, 1972). The case involved a dispute
between the town and four unions representing municipal employees over the legality
of an ordinance requiring the publication of union bargaining proposals. In ruling
that the ordinance violated the Connecticut Municipal Employee Relations Act, CONN.
GEN, STAT. ANN. §§ 7-467 to -477 (1972), the Board held that preliminary arrangements
for negotiation, including publicity, constituted a mandatory subject of bargaining
under the Act. Tl1e town ordinance was tlterefore held to be a prohibited practice,
since it l1ad the effect of unilaterally establishing the ground rules for negotiation. The
Board rejected the town's contention that the ordinance governed only a matter of
internal communications, even tltough one of the aims of the ordinance was to keep
the town council informed of the progress of negotiations. The Board also held that the
Connecticut "right-to-know" statute, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-19 to -21 (1972), did
not require public disclosure of bargaining proposals. These proposals, said the Board,
"do not automatically and immediately become public records." Dec. No. 1069, Slip
Op. at 8.
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Yet, they also are matters closely connected with educational policy,
usually considered to be within the authority of the school board.
This potential overlap of management functions with bargainable
subjects leads to some rather fine line-drawing by labor boards as
they attempt to strike a proper balance "between the duty of elected
officials to make decisions for the entire electorate and the statutory
right of employees to negotiate items directly affecting terms and
conditions of employment."152
The difficulty of striking this kind of balance is illustrated by
the New York PERB decision in West Irondequoit Board of Education,153 where the principal issue was class size. The hearing officer
determined that class size was a mandatory subject, since it was an
"integral component of the working environment."154 The Board,
however, modified the order, holding that class size was a policy
decision. In so doing, it drew a distinction between teaching load,
a mandatory subject of bargaining, and class size-a result which
provoked the dissenting member to observe that "the impact of
numerical limitations of class size upon teaching load is so direct
as to make a line of demarcation impossible."155
152. West Irondequoit Bd. of Educ., 4 N.Y. PER.B 4606, 4609 (1971) (hearing officer's
decision and recommended order).
153. 4 N.Y. PERB 3725 (1971), afjd. on rehearing, 4 N.Y. PER.B 3753 (1971) (board
decision and order).
154. 4 N.Y. PER.B at 4609.
155. 4 N.Y. PERB at 3728. The problem of the negotiability of questions of class
size and related issues was recently encountered by the Hawaii Public Employment
Relations Board (HERB) in two cases. Like its New York counterpart, HER.B experienced line-drawing difficulties in these areas. HERB agreed with the New York Board
that class size was a "hybrid issue," but it came to the opposite conclusion regarding
its bargainability. After balancing the respective interests of the parties, HERB held
class size to be a mandatory subject of bargaining. Hawaii State Teachers Assn., GERR
No. 480, at E-1 (Case No. CE-05-4, Dec. No. 22, Oct. 24, 1972).
In the second case, Petition for Declaratory Ruling by the Department of Education,
GERR No. 487, at B-9 (Case No. DR-05-5, Dec. No. 26, Jan. 12, 1973), however, HER.B
held similar issues to be nonbargainable, again in contrast to New York precedent. The
Hawaii State Teachers' Association, under a reopener provision of the contract, had
demanded that the teachers be granted preparation periods within the students'
instructional day and that workloads be limited. HERB referred to its earlier decision,
which it justified by noting that
[n]otwithstanding its admitted relation to educational policy, [HERB] found in
that instance that the element of impact on teachers' working conditions was
great, while the imposition of an average, statewide class size ratio had minimum
impact on the [board of education's] right to establish educational policy.
GERR No. 487, at B-13. The Hawaii Board found this rationale not to be controlling
in the second case, however. It said that the teacher workload proposal would force the
board of education to hire teachers and expand facilities regardless of its right and
duty to maintain efficient operations. HERB reasoned that
when the [board of education) is required to utilize methods which would cause
deterioration of the learning environment of the students, such as placing two
teachers in the same classroom or increasing team teaching regardless of a teacher's
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Where line-drawing is difficult and statutory language gives little
guidance, private sector precedents often become a compelling recourse. In City School District of the City of New Rochelle,156 the
New York PERB closely adhered to private sector precedent in
upholding the right of a school board to make budget cuts resulting
in the termination of the services of a number of teachers. The Board
noted that such budget cuts "obviously" affect terms and conditions
of employment. The Board concluded however that "the decision
to curtail services and eliminate jobs is not a mandatory subject of
negotiations, although the employer is obligated to negotiate on the
impact of such decision on the terms and conditions of employment
of the employees affected."157 Evident in this decision was the Board's
reliance on the Supreme Court's decision in Fibreboard Paper
Products Corp. v. NLRB.1r.s
The recent MERC decision in Westwood Community Schools,159
which may prove to be a landmark opinion, suggests a two-part
balancing test for determining whether a subject falls within management prerogative or whether it is a term or condition of employment and therefore a mandatory subject for bargaining. The tests
are: "(l) Is the subject of such vital concern to both labor and management that it is likely to lead to controversy and industrial conflict? And (2) is collective bargaining appropriate for resolving such
issues?" 160 At least two alternative readings could be given to the
JVestwood test. On the one hand, the test is offered as a substitute
for the mandatory-permissive distinction utilized in the private
sector. Since that distinction is merely a shorthand way of determining, on an ad hoc basis, whether the employer must bargain over
ability to team teach, it becomes obvious that the (board's] right and duty to
provide the best educational system possible is being mterfered with.
GERR No. 487, at B-13.
The opposite results of the New York and Hawaii Boards are partially explained by
the existence of HAWAII REv. STAT. § 89-9(d) (Supp. 1971), which prevents public
employers from agreeing to proposals that would restrict their rights to direct employees
and maintain an efficient government operation. However, it is not clear that this
management-rights clause wholly explains the contrasting outcomes. It appears that
two Boards have looked at similar facts and, using different but equally plausible
reasons, have arrived at opposite conclusions.

urn. 4 N.Y. PERB 3704 (1971).
157. 4 N.Y. PERB at 3706 (emphasis added).
158. 379 U.S. 203 (1964). See also City of Flint, 7 MERC Lab. Op. 913 (1972) (City
Civil Service Commission violated Michigan Public Employment Relations Act by refusing to bargain over the effects of reinstated residency requirements on city employees).
159. 7 MERC Lab. Op. 313 (1972).
160. 7 MERC Lab. Op. at 318-19.
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a given subject, the Westwood test may not be substantially different
from the private sector rule, but simply another and possibly a more
flexible formulation designed to reach the same end. Yet, a more
innovative interpretation was suggested by the language of the
Commission itself:
A balancing approach to bargaining may be more suited to the
realities of the public sector than the dichotomized scheme-mandatory and non-mandatory-used in the private sector. [The private
sector] scheme prohibits the use of economic weapons to compel
agreement to discuss non-mandatory subjects of bargaining, but
strikes are permissible once the point of impasse concerning mandatory subjects of bargaining is reached. Economic force is illegal in
the public sector . . . . In Michigan, in the public sector, economic
battle is to be replaced by invocation of the impasse resolution procedures of mediation and fact finding.
An expansion of the subjects about which the public employer
ought to bargain, unlike the private sector, should not result in a
corresponding increase in the use of economic force to resolve impasses. In the absence of legal public sector strikes, our only proper
concern in the area of subjects of bargaining is whether the employer's management functions are being unduly restrained. All bargaining has some limiting effect on an employer.
Therefore, we will not order bargaining in those cases where the
subjects are demonstrably within the core of entrepreneurial control.
Alt4ough such subjects may affect interests of employees, we do not
believe that such interests outweigh the right to manage.161

The Commission's juxtaposition of the duty to bargain and the
strike proscription impliedly presents the novel suggestion that the
scope of bargaining ought to be broader in the public sector than in
the private sector. According to this interpretation, since public
employees are ostensibly prevented from using the strike, or the
threat of a strike, to gain leverage at the bargaining table, there is
no point in severely restricting the subjects which may be brought
up in negotiations. The public employer cannot be penalized by
work stoppages for taking a hard-line bargaining position, nor is it
compelled to agree with any position taken by the employees' union
on any subject. Therefore, if the strike proscription is in effect and
is enforced, the agenda at the bargaining table should be open to
virtually any subject. The government, it may be suggested, has
the last word on the composition of the contract in any case, either
because the public employer has agreed to its terms, or because the
legislature must finally approve the contract.
Certainly, the language of the Westwood test suggests a very
broad scope for bargaining: the scope of bargaining may include any
161. 7 MERC Lab. Op. at 320-21.
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subject that "is likely to lead to controversy and industrial conflict."
Arguably, such language includes a number of subjects not within
the definition of "wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment"-the scope of mandatory bargaining in the private sector.
Instead of being a different method of formulating the mandatorypermissive distinction, therefore, the Westwood test may in fact
foreshadow a movement to free public sector bargaining from the
confines of this distinction.
One caveat must be added, however. The validity of the second
interpretation of the Westwood test depends on not only the existence, but also the effectiveness of the strike proscription. In those
states where strikes are legal, 162 the ·westwood test would seem inapplicable. In those states where strikes are illegal, but the proscription is not enforced, the application of the Westwood test would
seem to give public unions an unfair advantage at the negotiating
table, perhaps enabling them to coerce agreement on subjects that
in the private sector would not be mandatory subjects of bargaining.
In states such as New York, however, where the strike proscription
seems to be enforced with some vigor, the broader reading of the
TVestwood test may be of some value in delineating the parameters of
the duty to bargain.

VII.

THE DURATION OF THE DUTY To BARGAIN

Once it has been established that a subject is a mandatory or
permissive subject of bargaining, the next issue is: When may an
employer refuse to bargain further and take unilateral action instead?
In the private sector, an employer cannot take unilateral action
with regard to a mandatory subject where there has been no bargaining. However, following negotiations to a point of impasse on a
mandatory subject, the employer can take unilateral action, so long
as it does not exceed the terms of his final offer to the union.163
In the private sector, it has also generally been held that an
employer may take unilateral action at any time with respect to a
permissive subject. 164 These rules would seem applicable in those
162. See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
163. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962); NLRB v. U.S. Sonics Corp., 312 F.2d 610
(1st Cir. 1963). Cf. NLRB v. Crompton-Highland Mills, 337 U.S. 217 (1949).
164. Chemical Workers Local I v. Pittsburgh Plate Glas.s Co., 404 U.S. 157 (1971).
But see District 1, Marine Engrs., Docket No. BCB-91-71, Dec. No. B-1-72 (N.Y. City
Office of Collective Bargaining, Jan. 7, 1972), in which it was held that, during the
course of contract negotiations, a public employer may not take unilateral action with
respect to a "permissive" subject which was covered by a provision in the parties'
expired collective bargaining a~eement ttntil after the conclusion of impasse panel
proceedings.
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states where the pure collective-negotiations model regulates the
public sector. In pure meet-and-confer states, a public employer
presumably is free to implement unilaterally any proposals once the
statutory obligation to discuss them ·with the union has been
satisfied. In the modified meet-and-confer states, there is simply no
precedent to aid in the determination of how long an employer must
confer with the union in order to satisfy the obligation to "meet
and confer in good faith." It may be assumed that the obligation is
satisfied once it can truly be said that the employer has seriously
considered all of the union's proposals that are properly the subject
of bargaining. But whether there is an obligation to meet and confer
to a point of impasse may depend upon the terms of the governing
statute.165
Most public employers in jurisdictions which require collective
negotiations must bargain at least to impasse. However, the duration
of the duty to bargain in the public sector may extend beyond
impasse because most states and the federal government prescribe
elaborate impasse resolution mechanisms, including mediation, factfi.nding, legislative hearings, and compulsory arbitration, which may
be invoked following impasse. Both the public employer and union
are required to participate in the impasse procedures, once invoked,
in a further effort to reach a mutually satisfactory settlement. Impasse procedures thus clearly contemplate further "negotiations"
by the parties even where both sides have declared an impasse. As a
result, a public employer may not be able to take unilateral action
with regard to a mandatory subject, if at all, until after all impasse
procedures have been exhausted.166
165. The question of when an impasse has been reached was recently dealt with in
the Connecticut case of West Hartford Educ. Assn. v. DeCourcy, - Conn.-, 295 A.2d
526 (1972):
Some bargaining may go on even though the parties are unable to agree on
many topics. But, only if the deadlock on the critical issue demonstrates that there
is no realistic possibility that further discussions will be fruitful in bringing the
parties together generally on salaries and other conditions of employment can we
conclude that there is an impasse.
- Conn. at -, 295 A.2d at 542. This definition does not appear too different from the
one used in the private sector. In NLRB v. Tex-Tan, Inc., 318 F.2d 472 (1963), the
Fifth Circuit defined an impasse as "a state of facts in which the parties, despite the
best of faith, are simply deadlocked." 318 F.2d at 482. The factors relevant to the deter•
mination of whether an impasse exists should include: good faith bargaining up to the
point of deadlock; willingness to continue bargaining if it appears to offer hope of
resolving the deadlock; disagreement on all outstanding issues, or at least on all major
issues; and willingness to call in a mediator if necessary. In general, it must appear
that, despite the best efforts of the parties, there is no real prospect of an immediate
resolution of the problem through bargaining. See Comment, Impasse in Collective
Bargaining, 44 TEXAS L. REv. '769 (1966).
166. Cf. District 1, Marine Engrs., Docket No. BCB-91-71, Dec. No. B-1-72 (N.Y. City
Office of Collective Bargaining, Jan. 7, 1972), discussed in note 164 supra.
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In City of Dearborn,167 the Michigan Employment Relations
Commission firmly established the duty to bargain beyond impasse
for Michigan by ruling that a public employer failed to satisfy its
obligation to bargain in good faith when it refused to negotiate over
the recommendations contained in a fact finder's decision. In its
decision, MERC held that the mediation provision of the Michigan
Public Employment Relations Act168 "implicitly incorporates fact
finding into the collective bargaining process as it is contemplated by
the obligation of the duty to bargain."169 The Commission went on
to say:
Just as a strike may create conditions in which the parties would be
more willing to make concessions to compromise the matters in difference, the fact finder's recommendations may enlighten or persuade
them of the reasonableness or unreasonableness of their bargaining
position. The fact finder's report, thus, is the functional equivalent
of a strike and may change the factual situation regarding "the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder." ...
It must be given the same serious consideration as the initial bargaining proposals. Therefore, there is an affirmative obligation to
bargain in good faith about the substantive recommendations of the
report of a statutory fact finder.110
The city was held to have violated its obligation to bargain after
impasse because "[a]lthough the City demonstrated a willingness to
attend conferences and discuss the fact finder's report, it did not make
a serious attempt to reconcile its differences with the Union." 171 The
city was ordered to bargain; however, the Commission agreed with
the city that it had no statutory authority to order the city to implement the fact finder's recommendations as a remedy for the refusal
to bargain.172
Additional support for the proposition that the duty to bargain
in the public sector extends beyond impasse is provided by East
Hartford Education Association v. East Hartford Board of Education.173 The board and the association in this case failed to reach
agreement on a contract, even after mediation was invoked and the
dispute was submitted to nonbinding arbitration. Both parties re167. 7 MERC Lab. Op. 749 (1972).
168. MICH. CoMP. I.Aws ANN. § 42!1.207 (1967).
169. 7 MERC Lab. Op. at 757.
170. 7 MERC Lab. Op. at 758.
171. 7 MERC Lab. Op. at 759.
172. 7 MERC Lab. Op. at 760. This finding is analogous to the Supreme Court's
decision in H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970) (NLRB not authorized by law
to compel an employer to agree to a dues checkoff provision as a remedy for bad faith
bargaining).
173. GERR No. 484, at B-8 (No. 17 82 87, Hartford County, Conn., Super. Ct., Nov.
10, 1972).
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jected parts of the arbitrator's award, and, at that point, the board
refused to bargain further, claiming its legal duty had ceased. In
granting the association's petition for an injunction, Judge Naruk
said, "To argue that a board of education or teachers' union that
remains obdurate throughout the statutory procedures provided for
has c6mplied with the policy of the act is to exalt form over substance."174
East Hartford must be analyzed in light of the particular statutory
procedures provided. The final step of the impasse procedure in the
Connecticut teachers' bargaining law provides only for advisory
arbitration.175 Where statutes contain provisions for final and binding
arbitration,176 the problems encountered in East Hartford are unlikely to arise, for unless the arbitrator exceeds his authority, the
issuance of an award determines the composition of the contract.
Statutes containing nonbinding settlement procedures are much
more common, however. Where these statutes are controlling, the
import qf East Hartford, to the extent it is followed elsewhere, may
be that the parties may never reach the point where unilateral implementation is permissible. At the very least, the case stands for
the proposition that mere participation in statutory impasse procedures does not relieve a party of the duty to bargain in good faith.
An unyielding posture, characteristic of the state of impasse in the
private sector, may not be tolerable in the public sector.
The strike proscription, which is responsible for the suggestion
that there is a duty to bargain beyond impasse in the public sector,
is also the basis for New York holdings that at least some provisions
of an expired contract carry over until a new contract can be
negotiated. In Board of Education v. Connectquot Teachers Association,177 the supreme court for Suffolk County held that the board
was required to arbitrate a dispute notwithstanding the expiration
of the contract containing the arbitration clause. The court stated
that
[i]f public employees are prohibited from striking then they must be
protected during the hiatus between the expiration date of the old
contract and the signing of a new collective bargaining agreement. . •• Thus employees, who comply with the law, are entitled
to the maintenance of the status quo during the course of negotia-

tions,178
174. GERR No. 484, at 13-10.
175. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-153f(c) (Supp. 1973).
176. E.g., MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 423.231-.247 (Supp. 1972).
177. 81 LR.R.M. 2253 (1972).
178. 81 L.R.R.M. at 2254. Cf. District 1, Marine Engrs., Docket No. BCB-91-71, Dec,
No. B-1-72 (N.Y. City Office of Collective Bargaining, Jan. 7, 1972), discussed in note
164 supra.
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The New York PERB has reasoned similarly with respect to other
contract provisions. In Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Authority,179
PERB upheld a hearing officer's decision that the authority could
not refuse longevity increases to employees whose anniversaries arose
after the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement and_,.before
a new one could be negotiated, noting:
['I]he statutory prohibition against an employee organization resorting to self help by striking imposes a correlative duty upon a public
employer to refrain from altering terms and conditions of employment unilaterally during the course of negotiations. This duty of an
employer in the public sector to refrain from self help is greater than
is the similar duty of private sector employers.180

VIII.

ENFORCEMENT OF THE DUTY

To

BARGAIN

Most collective-negotiations states and some modified meet-andconfer states181 now provide for the enforcement of the duty to bargain by codes of unfair labor practices, which are often patterned
after section 8 of the NLRA and administered by state labor relations
boards. In Minnesota the remedy for unfair labor practices is an
action in district court. 182 In Oregon, a refusal to bargain in good
faith is not specifically made an unfair labor practice but is subject
to fact-finding hearings by the Oregon PERB.183 In a number of
other states, however, no unfair labor practices are stipulated;184
presumably, the aggrieved party in these cases should seek equitable
relief in court, provided that the statute otherwise requires good
faith bargaining.
Whatever the bargaining obligation placed upon public employers and employees, it must be made inescapable. Strict enforcement is particularly important in view of the fact that strikes-even
those provoked by a public employer's unfair labor practice-are
ordinarily prohibited in absolute terms. 185 But effective enforcement
is difficult where legislatures and courts are inclined to stress the
differences between public and private sectors to the end of limiting
the effectiveness of the bargaining process in the public sector. For
example, good faith bargaining cannot thrive when public employers
are led to believe that they may escape the consequences of a bad
179. 5 N.Y. PERB 3064 (1972).
180. 5 N.Y. PERB at 3064-65 (emphasis added).
181. E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4333 (Supp. 1972).
182. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.68(1) {Supp. 1973).
183. ORE. REv. STAT. § 243.745 (1971).
184. E.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 98-C, §§ 1-7 (Supp. 1971); S.D. COMP. LAws
§§ 3-18-1 to -17 (Supp. 1972).
185. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.68(1) (Supp. 1973).

ANN.
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bargain by a postnegotiations court challenge on the ground that
the disputed contract was ultra vires. In such an atmosphere, the
employer may be tempted to choose the easy path of agreeing to
contract provisions with which it cannot comply and which it has
no intention of honoring. Precedents such as Huntington Teachers,186 in which the New York court of appeals flatly rejected the
board of education's contention that it lacked authority to agree to
the challenged provisions can only enhance effective collective bargaining. The public employer must be convinced that it will be
required to live with whatever agreement is executed.
The need to appropriate public money to pay for negotiated
increases in wages and benefits is another characteristic unique to the
public sector that creates enforcement problems. It may be conceded
that, without its consent, a state legislature may not be compelled to
make appropriations; however, a public employer should not be able
to use a failure to appropriate as an excuse for either a refusal to
bargain or the total repudiation of an existing agreement. Rather,
both parties should be expected to make whatever adjustments are
necessary to accommodate the financial limitations of the employer.
In other words, the requirement of good faith bargaining should not
terminate in the face of fiscal obstacles.
An example of the type of adjustment that parties can make to
deal with financial limitations was seen in the Massachusetts decision,
Norton Teachers' Association v. Town of Norton.181 In that case,
the teachers were paid below the negotiated salary rate during the
first year of the contract because of an insufficient legislative appropriation. As a consequence, the agreement was amended to make an
appropriate increase in the salaries for the subsequent year. The
Massachusetts supreme court upheld the authority of the school
committee to agree to the amended contract on the basis of its authority to manage the public schools. The court prohibited the town
from withholding the necessary appropriation, which was othenv'ise
available, to cover the salary increases; the wage obligations were
seen as being no different from any other public debt.
Where public employers have attempted to use financial considerations as excuses for refusing to bargain or for repudiating an
agreement, courts and labor boards have recently exhibited a willingness to intervene. In a recent Michigan case, City of Flint,188 the city
refused to bargain with the general employees of the municipality
pending arbitration of a dispute involving the city firemen and possi186. See text accompanying notes 146-48 supra.
187. - Mass. - , 279 N.E.2d 659 (1972).
188. 7 MERC Lab. Op. 240 (1972).
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hie arbitration with police. The city claimed that it could not make
a wage offer since it would not know how much money was available
until after the arbitration. The Michigan Employment Relations
Commission, however, determined that the city could not refuse to
bargain with one group of employees because of the financial uncertainty resulting from a dispute with another group. The New York
PERB reached an analogous result in City of Albany.189
The lesson of the Michigan and New York cases is clear: financial
uncertainty is no justification for a total refusal to bargain. It is just
as clear, however, that such uncertainty can be a basis for a hard-line
position in negotiations. Hard bargaining is not in itself an unfair
labor practice, even in the private sector.190 The public employer
can take appropriations cutbacks into consideration in bargaining,
just as a private employer can take a sales decrease or a decline in
profits into account. Similarly, the public employer can take into
consideration the impact of bargaining on other units, as in cases
where pattern settlements are the rule or wage-parity agreements are
in effect.191 But there is a line between hard bargaining and no
bargaining, and vigorous enforcement of the duty to bargain can help
to clarify the contours of that line.
It is increasingly apparent in the developing case law that once a
contract has been signed, the public employer must, in effect, "adopt"
the contract and do everything reasonably within its power to see that
it is carried out. One way to "adopt" is for the public employer to
make economic benefits under the contract a priority item in its
budget. Illustratively, in Board of Education of the City of Bufjalo,192
the New York PERB held that the board of education did not have
complete discretion to rearrange school programs following the legislature's grant of a smaller appropriation than had been requested.
189. 5 N.Y. PERB 3061 (1972) (board decision), a/fg. 5 N.Y. PERB 4537 (1972), in
which the hearing officer ruled that budgetary uncertainty was no excuse for a refusal
to bargain on wage demands, especially since the amount of available funds would not
be known before the statutory impasse procedure was to come into effect. The hearing
officer stated that City School Dist. of the City of New Rochelle, 4 N.Y. PERB 3704
(1971) (discussed in text at notes 156-58 supra),
countenances some delay by a fiscally troubled employer in submitting negotiating
counterproposals on economic matters •••• But New Rochelle cannot be read as
absolving an employer of its obligation to submit any counterproposals on salaries
throughout an entire course of negotiations ••••
5 N.Y. PERB at 4541.
190. Dierks Forests, Inc., 148 N.L.R.B. 923 (1964).
191. City of Detroit (DPOA), 7 MERC Lab. Op. 1053 (1972). The city could take
into consideration a previous arbitration award granting firemen and police parity in
pay. It was, therefore, not an unfair labor practice for the city to bargain on the basis
that whatever salary increases the police could win would automatically go to firemen
as well.
192. 4 N.Y. PERB 4634 (1971).
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Mandatory subjects covered in the contract with the union were
held to take precedence over nonmandated programs in the allocation
of mon·ey under a less-than-fully-funded budget. This notion was
also recently explored-in great detail-in State v. AFSC11f.E Local
1726193 where the court ruled that since the subject of health insurance was within the scope of bargaining, a provision dealing with
health insurance in a collective bargaining agreement was lawful and
the State Department of Health and Social Services was required
to find the funds to implement the agreement. Signing the agreement, the court noted, obligated the Department to "pursue every
step within its power to see that the insurance is provided." 194
A second method of "adoption" is for the public employer to
ensure that the legislature (local or state) is aware of the need for an
appropriation to fulfill the terms of the contract. In some states,195
the public employer has a duty to submit a request for an appropriation within a certain time period after an agreement is reached.
In Connecticut, failure to submit such a request is a "prohibited
practice."196 Whether the employer has any duty beyond bare submission in these states has not yet been determined. But the employer
may have a responsibility for shepherding the request for appropriations through the legislature, at least at the local level. In the Rhode
Island case of Town of Scituate v. Scituate Teachers' Association,191
the Providence County superior court, reprimanding a school committee for not making its financial problems clear to the town meeting and for failing to call a special meeting to present the problem to
the voters, said, in effect, that the public employer must "try harder"
to acquire the means to fulfill its obligations.198
193. 81 L.R.R.M. 2836 (Del. Ch. 1972).
194. 81 L.R.R.M. at 2840. The court conceded that the state could not be bound to
spend funds not appropriated, but went on to observe:
On the other hand, the legislature certainly could not have intended that
agencies of the State should enter into these agreements and not be bound
thereby.••• [S]uch an interpretation would make a mockery and a meaningless
exercise of the statute.••• It follows that although their agreement could not
bind the department to the expenditure of funds for health insurance until those
funds had been properly appropriated, it could and did bind the department to
do all of those things contemplated which were within the department's legitimate
powers..•• [T]he department may not hide behind a veil of administrative inaction drawn across the terms of an othenvise properly negotiated instrument.
81 L.R.R.M. at 2839.
195. E.g., CONN. STAT. ANN. § 7-474(b) (1972); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 149, § 1781 (Supp.
1972).
196. CONN. STAT. ANN. § 7-474(b) (1972). A prohibited practice is virtually synonymous with "unfair labor practice" as used in the NLRA. See CONN. STAT. ANN. § 7-470
(1972).
197. 82 L.R.R.M. 2005, af/d., - R.I. -, 296 A.2d 466 (1972).
198. This dispute arose when the town meeting rejected the school committee's
request for a budget increase to pay higher teachers' salaries which the committee had
negotiated. As a result, the committee was confronted with the choice of fulfilling the
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"Adoption" may also be accomplished through a third methodby having the public employer use its emergency powers to fulfill its
contractual obligations. In Union Free School District No. 5,199 the
New York PERB held that the employer had failed to bargain in
good faith over pay increases and fringe benefits, despite the fact that
the voters had rejected two proposed budgets, leaving the school
district without adequate funding. PERB noted that the New York
Education Law permits a school board to levy, on its own initiative,
ta.xes necessary to pay for "teachers salaries" and "ordinary contingent expenses" when the voters reject proposed budgets,2'JO and since
salary matters were specifically covered by the law, and fringe benefits
were covered by the phrase "ordinary contingent expenses," the employer was not precluded either in fact or by law from paying the
agreed-upon increases.
Regardless of whether the administrative arm of government
fulfills its duty to adopt the contract, additional complications may
arise if the local legislature remains obdurate and refuses to make
appropriations to finance the contract. In affirming the superior
court's dismissal of Town of Scituate,201 where the trial court noted
the possible problems which such a refusal would create, the Rhode
Island supreme court said that it was not clear "whether and to what
extent a school committee may bind a_municipality to financial commitments for school purposes which cannot be satisfied from funds
appropriated or othenvise available for those purposes." 202 In another context, however, the Rhode Island supreme court has, in
effect, required an appropriation to be made by holding that an
arbitration award granting disputed benefits had the effect of a
judgment and that the lack of an appropriation was no excuse for
failure to pay a contractual debt. 203 A common pleas court in Pennsylvania has taken this reasoning one step farther. Even though no
judgment was involved, the court held that the contract itself provided sufficient authority for the court to order the City of Philadelphia to appropriate funds to continue disability payments to
policemen and firemen. 204 The contractual obligation constituted a
contract or making educationally detrimental cuts in the school program. The court
did not indicate what action it would take if the town again rejected a request for the
money needed to fund the contract. 82 L.R.R.M. at 2007.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

5 N.Y. PERB 3101 (1972).
N.Y. Enuc. !..Aw§ 2023 (McKinney Supp. 1971).
Town of Scituate v. Scituate Teachers' Assn., - R.I. -, 296 A.2d 466 (1972).
- R.I. at -, 296 A.2d at 469.
Teachers Local 958 v. School Comm., 108 R.I. 444, 276 A.2d 762 (1971).
Council 33, AFSCME v. Philadelphia, 81 L.R.R.M. 2539 (1971).
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debt of the city, the payment of which was enforceable to the same
extent as obligations incurred under any other contract.
It should be evident from the above discussion that states are
increasingly opting for vigorous enforcement of the duty to bargain,
even where it has ramifications for that most "public" of public
sector areas, the appropriations process. There seems to be a growing
realization that past fears concerning the effects of a relatively broad
duty to bargain have been largely unwarranted. Public employers
generally have not bargained away their "public trust" at the negotiations table, and the control of public fiscal matters has not been
taken from the hands of the legislature. The enforcement process has
made employers aware that there is a difference between hard bargaining and no bargaining, and has instilled in the minds of government administrators and appropriating bodies the concept that a
collective bargaining agreement is a solemn obligation requiring the
use of best efforts to ensure its implementation.

IX.

CONCLUSION

In states such as Michigan, New York, Pennsylvania, Connecticut,
and Wisconsin, the trend toward the use of private sector principles
to guide the development of labor relations in the public sector is
accelerating. In most of the remainder of the country, however, this
trend is not so well developed; indeed, it is nonexistent in many
states. The "leading" states may now be establishing precedents
which the others will eventually follow, though this is by no means
certain. The recent establishment of public employment relations
boards in such states as Kansas and Hawaii205 should add to the number of "leading" states and further accelerate the development of
public employee bargaining law.
The trend toward finding private sector analogues to public
sector problems has important implications for the bargaining rights
of public employees. First, it means that judiciary and administrative tribunals are placing more stress on the word "bargaining" and
less on the word "public." There is a dawning realization that public
employees are primarily employees and only secondarily government
employees. Therefore, they should be denied bargaining rights available to other employees only when there are compelling governmental or public policy reasons for such restrictions. Increasingly,
the discovery is being made that requiring a public employer to bargain collectively over a relatively wide range of subjects does not in
205. HAWAil REv. STAT,

§

89-5 (Supp. 1971); KAN. STAT.

ANN. §

75-4323 (Supp. 1972).
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itself prejudice the interests of the government. To compel bargaining is not to compel agreement.
Second, a number of outmoded concepts, of both ancient and
more recent vintage, are being discarded. Fears that public employee
bargaining would impinge on the sovereign authority of the state or
lead to illegal delegations of power by public employers have by and
large proved not to be justified. The meet-and-confer approach, once
believed to be a workable compromise between the right of the
public to control the political process and the right of employees to
bargain collectively, now appears to be obsolete and may eventually
disappear altogether. Where doubts concerning the efficacy of full
collective bargaining in the public sector remain, they are manifested in the enactment of statutory management-rights clauses designed, apparently, to retain a good measure of the public employer's
discretion with respect to subjects which would otherwise be bargainable. Such clauses do little to promote good faith bargaining on the
part of public employers, and they add to the burdens of courts and
public employment relations boards to the extent that they require
clarification in particular fact situations. However, managementrights clauses may not be insurmountable obstacles to the development of a broad scope of bargaining; as one case, IBEW Local
2219,206 has suggested, the burden may eventually devolve upon the
employer to show that a management-rights clause has been properly
invoked in a given case.
Third, the trend in public sector labor relations toward the
private sector model suggests that criteria must be developed to
identify situations in which private sector principles must legitimately be modified before they are applied to the public sector.
There are two primary distinctions between the two sectors: the
strike proscription and the nature of the political process, including
budgetary considerations. The strike proscription arguably (although
not necessarily in fact) denies to government employees a powerful
economic weapon available to other employees. To compensate for
the loss of this weapon, some tribunals have made adjustments in
duty to bargain requirements. One such adjustment is the extension
of the duration of the duty to include the impasse procedures which
function in part as strike substitutes. Additionally, the absence of
the strike weapon may entitle employees to the maintenance of the
status quo while a new contract is being negotiated. Another adjustment may come about if the Westwood Community Schools tests,207
206. See text accompanying notes 138-41 supra.
207. See text accompanying notes 159-61 supra.
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or at least the rationale for these tests, are adopted generally in place
of the mandatory-permissive distinction operative in the private
sector. So long as state legislatures believe that strikes in the public
sector ought to be proscribed, there may in fact be no reason to adhere strictly to the mandatory-permissive distinction. In that case
the real question relates to the appropriateness of the subject for bargaining and not to the consequences of a refusal to bargain in terms
of disruption of industrial peace, a key rationale for the strict lines
between mandatory and permissive subjects in the private sector. If
strikes are legalized, however, the mandatory-permissive distinction
would appear to be applicable to the public sector without qualification.
The relation of collective bargaining to the political process
raises thorny questions of the rights of public employees versus the
prerogatives of government. To what extent, for example, is a city
council free to pass ordinances of obvious community interest, even
though these may remove arguably mandatory subjects of bargaining
from the table? The problems become particularly difficult with respect to the budgetary process. To what extent must an employer
bargain on economic matters when its budget has not yet been drawn
up, much less approved by the legislature? What are the consequences
if an agreement is reached but the legislature cuts the budget? How
much should an employer cut back other operations to pay employees
according to the terms of the contract? The experience of the past
few years suggests that these questions can be answered in such a
way as to guarantee bargaining rights without jeopardizing government control of the public fisc. Clearly, there are limitations on the
extent to which the government may be required to appropriate and
allocate money, just as there are limitations on the extent to which
public employees may determine, through the bargaining process,
policies which are matters in the domain of the community as a
whole or its elected representatives. But the legitimate expectations
of public employees should not be thwarted by mere platitudes. The
determination that bargaining is not appropriate should be made
only after a searching examination of the competing policies involved. And where an agreement has been reached, it should be
denied enforcement only if the party seeking denial has carried the
burden of showing that all alternatives to nonenforcement have been
exhausted.

